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UNION DECISIONS ON COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING GOALS: A PROPOSAL FOR 
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION 
Eileen Silverstein*t 
As the statutory representative of workers in a bargaining 
unit, a labor union has sole authority to represent their interests 
in negotiations with management over the wages, hours, and 
terms and conditions of employment.1 Yet when conflicts of inter-
est arise within the bargaining ·unit, a union is not required to 
furnish a forum for debate on the economic choices facing the 
workers or to convey differences among the workers' views to 
management during negotiations. "[S]ubject always to com-
plete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its 
discretion, "2 the union may resolve internal disputes over collec-
tive bargaining provisions in any way it chooses. As a result, 
bargaining unit members must either work under the union-
negotiated contract, refraining from direct discussion with man-
agement over employment conditions, or quit their jobs.3 This 
Article assesses the consequences of unions' virtually unre-
strained power to set bargaining priorities and to reconcile antag-
onisms among the workers they represent. It then evaluates the 
function that economic interest groups within unions might serve 
if workers were encouraged to form interest groups O and these 
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of Nebraska; J.D. 1972, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
t My appreciation to James B. Atleson, Julius G. Getman, and Bernard D. Meltzer 
for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this Article. Special thanks to Robert 
J. Rabin for many lively conversations and for his constant encouragement. 
1. Labor organizations are also the exclusive representatives for bargaining unit 
members in disputes with management over alleged breaches of contract. See Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976) [hereinafter cited as L.M.R.A.] 
enacted in 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, as an amendment to the National Labor 
Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 [hereinafter cited as N.L.R.A.], and the 
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R.L.A.]. For con-
venience, statutory references will be limited to the N.L.R.A. unless differences in the 
R.L.A. are material to the discussion. Although some of the cases cited involve claims 
under the R.L.A. instead of the N.L.R.A., the standard of review is the same. See notes 
28 & 43 infra. 
2. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). 
3. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 
U.S. 50 (1975) (unionized employees who sought to bargain separately with their employer 
were not protected by § 7 of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), and their employer 
could discharge them). 
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groups were recognized as legitimate mechanisms for meeting the 
diverse needs of a heterogeneous workforce.4 
I. THE RULES OF THE GAME 
The legal framework in which unions operate is relatively 
simple. Congress has granted workers the right to organize for 
mutual aid and protection and to designate a bargaining repre-
sentative to deal with management on their behalf.6 The bargain-
ing representative is chosen by a majority of the workers in a 
bargaining unit6 and, once selected, becomes the exclusive repre-
sentative for all workers in the bargaining unit regardless of 
whether any particular worker wanted the union, and, in the case 
of new employees, whether the worker had any choice at all. 
The exclusivity requirement hinges on two assumptions: (1) 
a union can deal most effectively with employers if it speaks for 
a united front of workers;7 and (2) similarly situated workers, 
whatever their present differences, share common economic in-
terests over the long run that can be realized most effectively 
through an association governed by majority choice. 8 Although 
4. Atherton's definition of a group can be used to describe an economic interest 
group: 
The potential membership of our union is to be thought of as divided into 
several groups called A,B, C, etc. Within any one group, the members share identi-
cal preference orderings over all possible values of (w,h,t,p,e,S,). Indeed this is just 
what we mean, and all that we mean, by the word "group." A group's members 
need not share other characteristics such as skill, seniority, age, sex, race, current 
wage, or attitudes toward supervision, although as a practical matter they very well 
might. All that they must have in common to constitute a "group" is their prefer-
ence ordering over wages, etc. - and their common preference ordering must differ 
from that of every other group. 
. . • The real phenomenon which our partition into groups is meant 'to approximate 
is the organization divided into several blocs. Members of such blocs are apt to have 
aims which, while not perhaps identical, are nonetheless similar and markedly 
distinct from the objectives of members of other blocs. By assuming homogeneity 
of preferences within the groups of our model, we are putting aside the smaller 
differences in order to concentrate on the larger ones. 
W. ATHERTON, THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GoALS 80-81 (1973) (emphasis in original). 
5. N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
6. The N.L.R.A. provides for government-conducted elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) 
(1976). The judiciary has endorsed selection of the bargaining representative through 
voluntary recognition by the employer pursuant to a showing of majority authorization 
by the union, see Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301,304 (1974), 
or through a judicial or Board determination where employer conduct makes the holding 
of a fair election impossible, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1967). 
7. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.175, 180 (1967); Weyand, Majority 
Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 556, 565-67 (1945). 
8. For a historical discussion of the majority principle, see Schreiber, The Origin of 
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the validity of these assumptions is debatable,9 the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts have uncritically 
accepted them and have made decisions reflecting them. For ex-
ample, implicit in the assumption of common long-term goals is 
the belief that the NLRB always designates satisfactory bargain-
ing units. Although the Board considers a number of factors in 
determining an ·appropriate unit, it has looked principally to 
whether members of the proposed unit have a "community of 
interest" - whether they share common economic goals. Today, 
however, a community of interest reflects shared interests over 
time far less than it reflects management's description of present 
job conditions or union's delineation of the unit it can organize 
successfully .10 
Once a union becomes the exclusive representative, the labor 
laws say little about its obligations to those it represents. Under 
the 1935 Wagner Act, only employers could commit unfair labor 
practices. 11 When Congress finally prohibited unfair labor prac-
tices by unions, it only imposed obligations to deal fairly with 
employers and workers that mirrored employers' obligations to 
deal fairly with unions and employees. 12 Neither employers nor 
unions may interfere with worker self-organization, neither may 
penalize workers because of their support for or refusal to support 
a union, and each must bargain in good faith with the other.13 
the Majority Rule and the Simultaneous Development of Institutions to 'Protect the Mi-
nority: A Chapter in Early Amercan Law, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 237 (1971). Cf. McConnell, 
Historical Traits and Union Democracy, 81 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 603, 603 (1958) ("The 
democratic tradition which unions have followed ... is founded primarily, if not exclu-
sively, on the concept of majority rule."). 
9. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Indi-
vidual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897 (1975). See also 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition 
Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 73 (1975). 
10. See Schatzki, supra note 9, at 897-98 nn.3-4. 
11. 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1976); J. ATLESON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. 
SHERMAN, JR,, & E. SILVERSTEIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 84-86 (1978). 
13. Congress did amend the proviso to § 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), 
in a manner designed to strengthen the rights of workers against their employers. The 
proviso originally read: 
That any individual or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to 
present grievances to their employer. 
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 453. The amendment added: 
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining 
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a 
collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That 
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Just as the legislation does not regulate the terms and conditions 
of employment that management may establish for nonunionized 
employees, it does not obligate a union to reach a bargain that 
maximizes the interests of its members. Congress probably im-
posed no greater duty of unions toward members than that of 
employers toward employees because of some mystical faith in 
the marketplace. Theoretically, competition among employers 
will shape management's policies, and competition among unions 
will force the representatives to be accountable to their workers. 14 
Congress recognized that the marketplace theory may be 
the bargaining representative has been given the opportunity to be present at such 
adjustment. 
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136. This amendment appeared to strengthen the unionized 
workers' right to pursue their individual claims against the employer; however, in Empor-
ium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), the 
Supreme Court implied that the proviso of § 9(a) does no more than shield an employer 
from unfair labor practice charges if that employer meets with unionized employees over 
a grievance. That interpretation has blunted whatever potential the amendment had. For 
an excellent analysis of the legislative purpose in amending the proviso of§ 9(a), see Lynd, 
The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legisla-
tive History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975). 
14. The majoritarian selection of an exclusive representative disposes of decertifica-
tion as a possible safeguard for dissident union minorities. See Wellington, Union Democ-
racy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J, 
1327, 1337-38 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Union Democracy]. Cf. Jones, Disestab-
lishment of Labor Unions for Engaging in Racial Discrimination-A New Use for 
an Old Remedy, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 351, 355 (which proposes disestablishment for racially 
discriminatory unions instead of decertification, which is ineffective). In addition, the 
NLRB has held that a union may expel from membership a member who files a decertifi-
cation petition, because the member was attacking "the very existence of the union," 
Tawas Tube Prods. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 48 (1965); but a union may not fine a member 
who files a decertification petition, International Molders, Local 125, 178 N .L.R.B. 208 
(1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971). These cases arll discussed in Wellington, 
Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026-28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Union Fines]. Wellington correctly concludes: 
In view of the important public policies favoring union democracy, the N.L.R.B. 
should prohibit any form of discipline of dissidents who seek to unseat an incum-
bent union by means that Congress has sanctioned. The threat such dissidents pose 
to the union's ability to defend its certification is, at best, overstated. The greater 
danger is that the dissidents' fear of expulsion will perpetuate representation that 
is no longer responsive to the will of the membership. 
Id. at 1027-28 (footnote omitted). 
Elections for union officials offer dissident members no greater hope. In a study of 
local unions in Ohio between 1962 and 1967, Applebaum and Blaine found that local 
officers exchange positions but that turnover occurs within a single group, Applebaum & 
Blaine, The "Iron Law" Revisited: Oligarchy in Trade Union Locals, 26 LAB, L.J. 597 
(1975). See also J. SEIDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT 3 (2d ed. 1969). This 
finding parallels that of the classic studies finding minimal turnover in national and 
international officers. See Barnett, The Dominance of the National Union in American 
Labor Organization, 27 Q.J. EcoN. 455 (1913); Taft, Opposition to Union Officers in 
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flawed when it enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 15 
which prohibits the use of certain irrelevant criteria, including 
race, sex, and national origin, by unions or employers in making 
employment decisions. Unions had not secured equitable employ-
ment conditions for all of the workers they represented, and the 
failure was particularly conspicuous with women, blacks, and 
certain ethnic groups. Although Congress may have envisioned 
that labor organizations would reformulate any policies and prac-
tices that had limited the employment opportunities of persons 
protected by Title VII, the Act does not authorize disenchanted 
minority. workers to band together to influence collective bargain-
ing goals (even for the limited purpose of eliminating employ-
ment discrimination) .16 Title VII may affect some collective bar-
gaining choices, but Congress reaffirmed the exclusivity principle 
by leaving the protected classes out of union-management nego-
tiations, thus preserving unions' monopoly power to' pick and 
choose among their members' competing interests. 
The 1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(Landrum-Griffin) 17 stands unsteadily as the single exception to 
the legislative hands-off policy. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed it as a "code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of 
union affairs. " 18 The Act includes a catalogue of due process 
rights mandating regularity in the political and administrative 
processes of unions: hearings for disciplinary action against union 
members, 19 limitations on the length of trusteeships, 20 regulations 
on reporting payments to and from officers and employees of 
Elections, 58 Q.J. EcoN. 246 (1944). See also Tenure of Union Officers, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Feb. 1971, at 62; J. STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, 
POLICY 31-32 (1973). Whether at the local level where grievance resolution is significant 
or at the national or international level where bargaining choices matter most, these 
studies suggest that economic interests held by a minority of workers may not be repre-
sented over time. 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976). See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976), amended by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1978, Pub. L. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189. 
16. It would perhaps have been anomalous if Congress had developed a structure that 
recognized these groups as separate from their unions, since each group's membership 
would be based on suspect, employment-irrelevant characteristics. On the other hand, the 
employment conditions associated with being black or being female do constitute easily. 
identifiable and relevant interests, and the ability of groups of b_Iacks and women suitably 
to represent those interests may logically follow from such conditions. 
11. 29 u.s.q. §§ 401-531 (1976). 
18. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967). 
19. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976). 
20. 29 u.s.c. §§ 461-466 (1976). 
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labor organizations, 21 and requirements for timely elections of 
union officers.22 However, the affirmative obligations to give 
members an equal voice in elections and to respect members' free 
speech and assembly rights are subject to "reasonable rules and 
regulations in [a labor] organization's constitution and by-
laws"23 and to "the organization's established and reasonable 
rules . . . as to the responsibility of every member toward the 
organization as an institution."24 Thus, the provisions of each 
union's constitution qualify key participatory safeguards of 
Landrum-Griffin. If a union constitution calls for referenda on 
policy decisions, or ratification of collective bargaining agree-
ments, or rank-and-file elections of union officials, then the equal 
rights and free speech provisions of the Act guarantee all mem-
bers access to these processes.25 But the Act does not require 
unions to include members directly in policy making, either 
through referenda or through contract ratification. 
IL AN ARGUMENT FOR REQUIRING MORE FROM THE EXCLUSIVE 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Congressional acceptance of the ways unions reconcile the 
competing interests of their members is understandable. Major-
ity rule is central to labor relations theory. 26 And except for the 
thorny problems of racism, ageism, and sexism (problems that 
are scarcely confined to the functions of unions), most unions 
appear to meet the minimal demands of most of their constitu-
ents. However, because a union is a coalition of many diverse 
economic interest groups, its responsibilities should not automat-
ically be defined by such a simplistic standard. Sufficient indica-
tors of dissatisfaction with union policies exist to merit a reeval-
uation of the role of economic interest groups in unions. This 
21. 29 u.s.c. §§ 431-440 (1976). 
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1976). 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976) impose fiduciary obliga-
tions on union officials. See Leslie, Federal Courts and Union Fiduciaries, 76 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1314 (1976). 
23. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) (1976). 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976). 
25. Overly restrictive judicial interpretations have blunted the effectiveness of the 
equal rights and free speech provisions of Landrum-Griffin. See text at notes 51-55 infra. 
26. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 
50, 62 (1975). When using the term "majority rule," I am referring to decisions made by 
an already unionized workforce. Nothing I say is intended to be applied to the requirement 
that a majority of bargaining unit members must favor union representation for a union 
to secure or retain representation rights. 
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Section discusses the evidence of this dissatisfaction, which de-
rives from the complaints of workers represented by unions and 
from scholarly discussions.27 It then evaluates the competing con-
sideration - majority rule. 
A. Evidence of Dissatisfaction Among Unionized Workers 
A major sign of the inadequacy of union policies comes from 
the members themselves. Expressions of discontent by workers in 
unions is especially credible because the workers involved are not 
seeking to eliminate unions from the workplace. Rather, their 
discontent reflects a desire to improve and strengthen unions, and 
takes many forms, from assaults on union-negotiated contracts to 
campaigns to influence union policies. 
The most persuasive indicator of workers' dissatisfaction 
with unions may be their persistence in suing to reform collective 
bargaining agreements on the ground of union dereliction of duty 
despite the almost certain failure of such suits. The Supreme 
Court has made that failure likely by interpreting a union's duty 
of fair representation to include a presumption favoring the union 
leadership when members test a union's resolution of interest 
group conflicts.28 In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 29 the Supreme 
Court emphasized that a labor organization's negotiators enjoy a 
"wide range of reasonableness" in exercising their "discretion to 
make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the 
27. For a different approach to the same issue, see Schatzki, supra note 9, at 898-
918. 
28. Courts once looked more favorably upon workers challenging the performance of 
an exclusive representative. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the 
Supreme Court acknowledged an implicit statutory limitation on an exclusive representa-
tive's capacity to compromise its members' interests. The Court determined that, in 
collective bargaining, a union must "represent non-union or minority union members . . . 
without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 323 U.S. at 204. 
Under this formulation, courts could have required unions to justify their acceptance of 
challenged contract terms by demonstrating that the terms benefited the bargaining unit 
as a whole and that the means chosen was the least destructive to worker expectations. 
Instead, the Supreme Court later chose the deferential path drawn in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See text at 
notes 29-42 infra. 
Although·Steele was a suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, later that term the 
Court extended its holding - that the grant of exclusivity under the R.L.A. imposed a 
duty of fair representation on the union - to exclusive bargaining representatives under 
the broader National Labor Relations Act in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). 
Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (duty exists even in 
absence of certification as bargaining representative). 
29. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). 
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light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the 
interests of the parties represented. "30 In Huffman, the union 
agreed to a contract emendation that benefited only one group of 
World War II veteran-employees by granting them fictionalized 
seniority. Although alternative formulae might have achieved the 
parties' purpose of rewarding on& class of veterans for military 
service, the Court found that, in accepting provisions that disad-
vantaged other veteran-employees and all nonveteran-employees, 
the workers' bargaining representative met its duty "to make an 
honest effort to serve the interest of all of [its] members, without 
hostility to any. "31 
The Court extended the Huffman rationale to the grievance-
presentation phase of representation in Humphrey v. Moore, 32 
stating that a union does not breach its duty of fair representation 
by taking a position adverse to one group of workers. In 
Humphrey, the union represented two antagonistic factions of 
employees in a seniority dispute resolved by a joint union-
management committee. The Court recognized the inherent con-
flict between employees represented by the same union, but in 
the absence of "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or 
dishonest conduct, "33 refused "to remove or gag" the union, since 
that "would surely weaken the collective bargaining and griev-
ance processes."34 
As long as considerations of race and membership status are 
not the basis for allowing contractual benefits, the Huffman-
Humphrey rationale effectively shields a union's collective bar-
gaining decisions from judicial review. 35 Yet bargaining unit 
30. 345 U.S. at 338, 337-38. 
31. 345 U.S. at 337. 
32. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
33. 375 U.S. at 348. 
34. 375 U.S. at 350. But see Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 142-43, 
143 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discusses various approaches to reviewing union decisions 
adjusting seniority rights). 
35. Prevailing doctrine states that§ 301 of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), does 
not establish an action for workers against unions in the absence of a contract dispute with 
management. Only when workers allege that the union violated its duty of fair representa-
tion in connection with an employer's breach of contract can the courts assert jurisdiction, 
The workers may then sue the union alone or the employer and union jointly, In either 
circumstance, the disgruntled employee must prove both the employer's breach of con-
tract and the union's violation of the fair representation duty to establish joint or union 
liability. Vaca v. Sipes; 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Since any challenge to a union's support of 
one group of workers over another in forming bargaining goals does not implicate the 
employer, the Vaca requirements probably make a § 301 suit unavailable. Workers can 
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members continue to file duty-of-fair-representation suits, alleg-
ing that a union's performance is "arbitrary," rooted in 
"hostility," or lacking in "good faith" and "honesty of purpose."36 
For example, when a union negotiates adjustments in seniority 
rights following changes in a bargaining unit's membership, 
workers are not untoward to expect the union to have a sound. 
basis for favoring one group of employees over another. However, 
as Keane v. Eastern Freightways, Inc. 37 demonstrates, worker 
expectations may be sorely disappointed. In Keane, the union's 
Joint Area Committee determined that endtailing rather than 
dovetailing38 appropriately resolved a seniority dispute following 
a ·corporate takeover. The union representing the employees of 
the surviving corporation successfully argued that the takeover 
was an acquisition and not a merger. Not surprisingly, the e.m-
ployees who were endtailed were represented by a defunct union 
and had not voted for the leaders of the remaining union. The 
court in Keane stated: 
The plaintiffs were newcomers to [Local] 560 from [Local] 478. 
There can be no doubt that union politics were not wholly absent 
from the decision made by 560 to support its older members 
against the Associated workers. But mere partisan influence in the 
decision-making process is not itself grounds for relief.39 
challenge a union decision by filing an unfair labor practice charge alleging violation of 
§ 8(b)(l)(A) of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1976). See Miranda Fuel Co., 
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12, 
United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). 
36. Labeling the union's violation of its duty of fair representation is not the least of 
plaintiffs' burdens. In Huffman and Humphrey, the major decisions dealing with union 
resolution of internal conflicts, the Supreme Court did not use the word "arbitrary" to 
describe unlawful union conduct. "Arbitrary" first appeared in duty of fair representation 
jurisprudence in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967), a case involving a union's refusal 
to take a grievance to arbitration. In Vaca, the Supreme Court stated that a breach of 
the duty "occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargain-
ing unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," citing Humphrey and Huffman. 
These citations may justify including the term "arbitrary" in the catalogue of characteri-
zations for determining the legality of union conduct in collective bargaining. For a sum-
mary of the terms used by the Supreme Court to define the duty of fair representation, 
see Aaron, The Duty of Fair Representation: An Oueruiew, in THE DUTY OF FAIR 
REPRESENTATION 8, 18-21 (J.T. McKelvey ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE DUTY OF FAIR 
REPRESENTATION]. 
37. 92 L.R.R.M. 3092 (D.N.J. 1976). 
38. When seniority lists are endtailed, one group of employees receives priority over 
another group and no attempt is made to integrate the lists on the basis of a controlling 
principle such as length of employment. Dovetailing requires the integration of previously 
separate seniority lists on some basis - e.g., by length of service, by ratio, by rank. See 
Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 lNo. LAB. REL. REV. 361 (1955). 
39. 92 L.R.R.M. at 3097. 
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The NLRB appears to agree that "mere partisan influence" 
is not the kind of arbitrary or hostile conduct Congress contem-
plated in imposing the duty of fair representation. 40 In a 1977 
memorandum, the General Counsel's office advised that the 
NLRB would not question a union's choice among competing 
interests unless that choice was wholly without objective justifi-
cation and was based exclusively upon political considerations.41 
However, since practically all partisan union decisions can be 
rationalized at least in part by objective factors, the Board's stan-
dard provides no genuine check on union discretion. The union 
need only reject the employees' version of the facts to "act 
'responsible' and wear the face of fairness"42 while using its con-
trol over the collective bargaining process to reward its political 
supporters. 
40. The NLRB has heard complaints that a union has violated its duty of fair repre-
sentation, finding jurisdiction under § 8(b)(l)(A) of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 
158(b)(l)(A) (1976), which makes it an unlawful employment practice for a labor organi-
zation "to restrain or coerce .•. employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 
7." The Supreme Court has assumed, without holding, that the Board has authority to 
remedy duty-of-fair-repre~entation violations. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.171, 182-83, 186 
(1967). 
41. Strick Corp. (UAW Local 644), 95 L.R.R.M. 1526 (Advice Memo 1977). The 
memorandum purported to explain the decision in Barton Brands, Ltd., 213 N .L.R.B. 640 
(1974), enforcement denied and remanded, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976). In Barton, the 
Board found that a union had violated § 8(b)(l)(A) by resolving a seniority issue solely 
to satisfy the interests of the numerical majority in the bargaining unit. The Board's 
decision in Barton was simplified by the union's initial acceptance of a seniority provision 
requiring dovetailing that only wavered after proposed layoffs threatened the union's 
original, and numerically greater, constituency. The Board's retreat from Barton Brands 
appears to be complete. See Steelworkers Local 7748 (Eaton Corp.), 246 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 
102 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1979). Cf. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (politically motivated opposition to seniority dovetailing violated § 8(b)(l)(A)); 
Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961) (the discrimination 
claim of members of a weaker union following transfers from a defunct railroad line is an 
issue of fact and should go to trial). 
42. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N .Y .U. 
L. REv. 362, 393 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Individual Rights]. Summers has argued 
elsewhere that a union's support for one employee group's position is fundamentally fair 
so long as the union obeys the collective bargaining agreement; that is the mechanism by 
which the union - and through it, the employees - agreed to conduct their affairs dur-
ing the term of the agreement. He reaches the same conclusion when the agreement 
provides no express direction but an established past practice is evidence. Summers, The 
Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair 
Representation?, in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 36, at 60 [herein-
after cited as What Constitutes Fair Representation?]. Summers still maintains, how-
ever, that an individual worker is entitled to nondiscriminatory and consistent application 
of the agreement's provisions, free from "personal hostility, political oppression, or racial 
prejudice." Id. at 82. 
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The point is made brutally clear in Deboles v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. 43 The International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers (IAM) represented all of TWA's aircraft 
maintenance employees across the country, including those at the 
Kennedy Space Center, where TWA had a contract with NASA. 
Under the 1964 national IAM-TWA contract, employees accrued 
seniority in their job classifications based on length of time in 
that classification, regardless of the TWA location at which they 
worked. TWA used this national seniority ranking to permit em-
ployees to bid into other jobs within a classification and to bump 
less senior employees during layoffs. But those !AM-represented 
employees who worked at the Space Center were not included in 
the national seniority system until 1970, and even then were not 
given retroactive seniority for time in their classification at the 
Space Center before 1970. Thus, a 1;W A employee at the Space 
Center had considerably less job security than any other TWA 
employee. Citing the testimony of TWA negotiators and petitions 
from workers who opposed equalizing seniority, the Space Center 
employees charged that IAM negotiated the separate seniority 
provisions "to protect its own members elsewhere in the system 
from the risk of being bumped from their positions in the event 
of termination of TWA's contract with NASA at the Space Cen-
ter. "44 The court of appeals, however, upheld the trial court's 
finding that TWA's interest in a stable workforce at the Space 
Center was a "relevant consideration" justifying union accept-
ance of the restrictive seniority system. 
In light of the facts in Deboles, the appellate court's reliance 
upon that consideration seems misplaced. The so-called relevant 
consideration appears to have been of minimal relevance to both 
management and union; the court acknowledged that IAM offi-
cials withdrew one proposal that would have given retroactive 
seniority to Space Center employees, in response not to TWA's 
43. 552 F.2d ·1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). Throughout Debo/es, 
the court discusses similar cases. See also Duggan v. 1AM, 510 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1975). 
In Duggan, the unions negotiated an industry-wide contract that cost the plaintiff flight 
engineers their jobs. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the Supreme Court's use of the term 
"arbitrary" in setting the standard for duty-of-fair-representation violations broadened 
the scope of the union's duty; nevertheless, the court assumed that the union did not 
breach the duty of fair representation, even though some flight engineers terminated 
under the agreement received substantial severence pay while others did not. See also 
Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201,277 N.W. 885 (1938) (union justified 
in destroying the seniority rights of women to keep men employed). 
44. 552 F.2d at 1010. 
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insistence on the need for a stable workforce but rather to pres-
sure from IAM's members elsewhere. Workforce stability was but 
a smokescreen to obscure IAM's concessions to non-Space Center 
employees. Moreover, to gain ratification IAM officials made 
admittedly false statements to Space Center employees, saying 
that IAM had done "everything in its power to obtain retroactive 
system seniority, but that TWA had attached unacceptable con-
ditions. "45 Yet the court found no breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. The court also declined to address the argument that 
the goal of a stable workforce could have been achieved by re-
stricting transfer rights into and out of the Space Center facility, 
instead of absolutely denying Space Center employees the oppor-
tunity to accrue seniority in the national ranking system. IAM's 
ploy in Deboles was not unique. Unions can easily justify partisan 
decisions by alleging employer intransigence, and courts accept 
these arguments uncritically, under the impression that the duty 
of fair representation does not require judges to examine a 
union's search for alternative solutions less disadvantageous to 
dissident groups in the bargaining unit.46 
Union members who assert a right to influence decisions on 
union policy are no more likely to succeed than members who 
challenge a bargain their union has made on their behalf. It is 
well settled that unions are not required to give rank-and-file 
members the opportunity to ratify collective bargaining agree-
ments.47 Where union constitutions provide for worker approval, 
however, one might expect that members could cast a meaningful 
vote on the terms and conditions under which they will work. But, 
as Davey v. Fitzsimmons48 illustrates, unions are allowed much 
leeway in designing their ratification procedures. In Davey, mem-
bers of various Teamsters locals sought to enjoin the national 
Teamsters leadership from enforcing its ratification plan for a 
national agreement that included thirty-two supplemental area 
contracts. Under the leadership plan, the entire package was to 
be submitted to the national membership for majority ratifica-
tion. The plaintiffs argued that the union constitutional provision 
45. 552 F.2d at 1013. 
46. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See also Strick Corp. 
(UAW Local 644), 95 L.R.R.M. 1526 (Advice Memo 1977). 
47. Confederated Indep. Unions Local 1 v. Rockwell-Standard Co,, 465 F.2d 1137, 
1140 (3d Cir. 1972); Davis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 97 L.R.R.M. 3141, 3143 (W.D. 
Va. 1977) (ratification by union members not required as long as union constitution 
permits union to act without members' authorization or consent). 
48. 413 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1976). . 
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for submission "to the membership covered by the contract" re-
quired that all workers vote on the national contract but that only 
those workers affected by an area supplemental agreement vote 
on the provisions for their area. Such a construction would have 
maximized the value of ratification by requiring every enforcea-
ble provision to be approved by a majority of those whose lives it 
affected. Judge Bryant, in dismissing an allegation that the single 
national vote violated the Landrum-Griffin's guarantee of equal 
voting rights, 49 interpreted the constitutional provision to allow 
submission of all employment terms in a single referendum to the 
entire membership. The court felt that binding locals to area 
supplements through a national vote was a permissible tradeoff 
for the overall benefits of national negotiations. 50 
Workers attempting to influence union decisions before 
collective bargaining begins may also find that unions can limit 
effective opposition to leadership recommendations. In Newman 
v. Local 1101, Communications Workers of America (CWA), 51 a 
job steward, who was a member of a group within his local called 
"United Action," fought the union leadership's tactics and pro-
grams for upcoming contract negotiations. Reversing the grant of 
a preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit held that the union 
leaders could remove the dissident without violating the free 
speech and antidisciplinary provisions of Landrum-Griffin.52 Al-
though it acknowledged that a union member could not be ex-
pelled in reprisal for exercising free speech rights, the court never-
theless upheld the union's action: · 
[O]nce he accepts a union position obligating him fairly to ex-
plain or carry out the union's policies or programs, he may not 
engage in conduct inconsistent with these duties without risking 
removal as an official or employee (but not as a union member) 
on the ground that his conduct precludes his effective representa-
49. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) (1976). 
50. Judge Bryant stated: 
While package ratification may not represent the most desirable mode of ratifica-
tion from the point of view of all union members [and] [wJhile plaintiffs object 
to being bound by the area supplement applicable to them merely because a major-
ity of members nationally approve of the package as a whole, this is simply a result 
of the tradeoff that the union, in conformity with its own rules and procedures, has 
determined to be an acceptable price to be paid in return for the overall benefits of 
the national negotiating process. And the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that 
the union may not make such a choice. 
413 F. Supp. at 677. 
51. 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978). 
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), 529 (1976). 
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tion of the union. Unless the management of a union, like that of 
any other going enterprise, could command a reasonable degree of 
loyalty and support from its representatives, it could not effec-
tively function very long.53 
The court of appeals found no chilling of free speech rights 
since "despite a prior decertification as a job steward and the 
union leadership's prior refusal to certify him after election to 
that office, Newman continued to exercise his free speech rights 
as a union member, conducting vigorous campaigns for greater 
democratization in opposition to [the local's] incumbent leader-
ship."54 
In the same way that union members expect that officers as 
well as members will have the right to speak out about union 
policies, they might expect the opportunity to communicate with 
their coworkers about issues facing the union. But some union 
leaderships - with judicial approval - have effectively limited 
members' rights to address one another. In Murphy v. Local 18, 
International Union of Operating Engineers, 55 Local 18, which has 
jurisdiction over districts in eighty-nine Ohio and Kentucky 
counties, called district meetings to solicit members' views on 
bargaining proposals, but a union official refused to let dissident 
members address district meetings other than their own. The 
dissidents believed that informative discussion of the contract 
proposals would include presentations by supporters and oppo-
nents, regardless of the districts in which they worked. That be-
lief seemed reasonable, since the leadership could move from dis-
trict to district explaining its position. However, the dissident 
members were disappointed to learn that, because the union con-
stitution and bylaws provided for separate district meetings, the 
leadership's denial of access to other locals was not a violation of 
section lOl(a)(l) of Landrum-Griffin. 
These examples of worker dissatisfaction with the exclusive 
representative are not isolated. They exist throughout the repre-
sentation process from the election of union leadership to the 
formulation of collective bargaining proposals and contract ratifi-
cation. And they are symptoms of a flaw in the framework of 
union-member relations. 
53. 570 F.2d at 445 (emphasis added). 
54. 570 F.2d at 448. Before passage of Landrum-Griffin, Joel Seidman condemned the 
power of union officials and those union constitutional provisions that could be used to 
discipline members. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 14, at 13-17, 40-41; compare id. at 60-70. 
55. 99 L.R.R.M. 2074 (N.D. Ohio 1978). 
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B. Evzdence That Scholars Recognize a Need to Regulate 
the Exclusive Representative 
Soon after the consolidation of union power, scholarly com-
mentators expressed concern that unions might disregard or 
suppress the interests of some memhers.56 During the last twenty 
years, however, only limited discussion has appeared concerning 
the problems of interest groups within unions. This Section 
analyzes the most significant contributions that scholars have 
made to the analysis of this important issue. 
As early as 1958, Harry Wellington responded to proposals 
for federal legislation to democratize unions57 by suggesting that 
Congress explicitly give the NLRB jurisdiction to review union 
compliance with the duty of fair representation. 58 Under his pro-
posal, the Board would apply a standard of employee-community 
expectations when evaluating a 'challenged union decision. He did 
not elaborate this review standard beyond indicating that the 
Board would consider the nature of the employees' claim, the 
reasonableness of the employees' expectation, the relevant in-
dustrial practice, and other pertinent factors. According to Wel-
lington, the Board was the appropriate reviewing body because 
it had the expertise in labor relations necessary for an informed 
judgment - an expertise that cultivates sensitivity to employee-
community expectations. 59 
When Wellington made his proposal, an assumption of 
56. A representative sample would include: Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty 
of Fair Representation, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Criti-
cal Job Interests: Union-Management Authority v. Employer Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 631 (1959); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative 
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435 (1963); 
Cox-, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Dunau, Employee 
Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 CoLUM. L. REV. 731 
(1950); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 563 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14. 
57. Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14, at 1357-61. Wellington particularly 
opposed federal legislation regulating union admission, disciplinary, and election deci-
sions. He rejected such federal legislation as unnecessary and unwise, in light of Steele v. 
Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), see note 28 supra, and considerations of federal-
ism. His view did not prevail, and Congress enacted Landrum-Griffin. Compare Welling-
ton's evaluation of that Act, as enforced, in Union Fines, supra note 14. 
58. When that article appeared, no case clearly held that the NLRB had jurisdiction 
to hear duty-of-fair-representation claims. See note 40 supra. 
59. Wellington did not say whether a distinction should be' drawn between contract 
administration and negotiation, but the tenor of the article suggests that, since the duty 
of fair representation is applicable to both phases, his model for review would also apply 
to both. 
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NLRB expertise prevailed. 6° Contemporary research has shown, 
however, that Board evaluations of worker attitudes are often 
intuitive at best.61 Moreover, even in 1958 it may have been too 
much to expect an agency to determine employee and community 
expectations existing at the time an issue was originally resolved. 
The only relevant expectations would be those at the instant time 
of the union decision, not during the period of NLRB review. Yet 
the effects of a union decision that are known only by hindsight 
would certainly color the measurable expectations of the affected 
employees and community. 62 And even if one ignores the corrosive 
effects of time, one cannot ignore the costs of the detailed factual 
investigations and hearings that review under such a standard 
would necessitate. Simple polling could never suffice when the 
credibility of each individual respondent would be such an impor-
tant factor in computing an aggregate "expectation." 
Postdecision review can also threaten industrial stability by 
unsettling the expectations of the union, the workers, and the 
management about the completed agreement. Even if not 
abused, it could interpose long delays between the signing of an 
agreement and the day it takes full effect. These delays could 
hamper the union's ability to bargain successfully with manage-
ment. Although management might be no less willing to enter 
collective bargaining agreements, its fears that the settlement 
could come undone might skew the bargain it is willing to strike. n:i 
60. In a series· of cases between 1957 and 1960, the Supreme Court repeatedly refused 
to review the merits of arbitration award decisions, see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 664 
(1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
61. See J. GETMAN, s. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELEOI'IONS: 
LAW AND REALITY (1976). 
62. See NLRB v. Local 316, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976), 
where the union's executive board and the court of appeals agreed that an election to 
determine the members' seniority rights was invalid " 'because a vote was taken after 
the fact that an operation was being eliminated and that a fair vote could not be taken 
at this time.'" 545 F.2d at 1175. The court held further, "[T]o base its decision as to 
whether the bumping principle should in general be applied to this Employer upon an 
expression from the employees so limited in scope and focus constituted arbitrary Union 
action without rational basis .... " 545 F.2d at 1176. It is suggested, however, that a 
membership vote on policy would be acceptable if it were taken before the effect of a 
particular management decision was known. 545 F.2d at 1176. 
63. While the conce~ for stability does weigh against an increase in participation 
rights for interest groups, I will argue that controlling the nature and frequency of postde-
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The Wellington proposal poses two additional problems. 
First, Board review of union decisions may be an empty gesture. 
In light of the deference usually shown union actions toward 
workers, 64 the Board might translate the employee-community 
expectation test into a copy of the lenient duty of fair representa-
tion. The broad rubber stamp would have been passed from the 
courts65 to the Board. Second, resort to the Board may off er the 
aggrieved employee~ no significant savings of time or money over 
court litigation. Even though workers discharged in a merger 
would not need an attorney before the Board, they would still 
need wages while they awaited a decision. 66 Although the un-
happy workers might successfully force their union to arbitrate 
with management by filing a charge before the NLRB, they would 
still be represented by an indifferent - even hostile - agent. 
Nonetheless, the Board would be hesitant to look behind the 
arbitration to assess the adequacy of the union's representation, o; 
given the availability of courts and duty-of-fair-representation 
suits to perform that task after the arbitrator renders a decision.GK 
Thus, Board review would only complicate the workers' challenge 
to the actions of their exclusive representative. 69 
cision review will minimize instability and notify management of the likelihood of the final 
agreement's approval. See Section III of this Article infra. The Wellington suggestion does 
not offer any controls on the frequency of postdecision review. 
64. See text at notes 29-50 supra. 
65. Courts may also reduce employee expectations through their recurring emphasis 
upon stable ·collective bargaining and the need for industrial peace through bargaining. 
Wellington, however, did not consider the effect of Board review on the bargaining rela-
tionship. 
66. Additionally, the Collyer doctrine of Board prearbitral deferral would, in some 
instances, foreclose de novo Board review. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 
(1971); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). National Radio Co. was overruled 
in 1977 because of a change in Board membership. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 
N.L.R.B. 808 (1977) (3-2 decision). While, at present, the Board probably will not defer 
discharge disputes and other individual statutory rights cases under Collyer, there is no 
guarantee that Collyer's philosophy will not once again be extended to cases of discharge 
and§ 7 rights under the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
67. As an initial matter, grievants seeking a Board hearing would need to be suffi-
ciently sophisticated to be aware that their unfair labor practice charge might cause a 
union decision in favor of arbitration; they would then need evidence that the union 
evidenced bad faith in initially refusing to take the case to arbitration. 
68. Cf. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447 (1977), overruling Bekins Moving & 
Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 146-48 (1974) (where the dissenters argued that review of 
a union's certification, requested by minority workers, should be made only after the 
certification and the alleged violation of the duty of fair representation). 
69. This consequence could be avoided if the Board's jurisdiction to determine the 
merits of interest group disputes were not tied completely to its authority to hear and 
remedy duty-of-fair-representation cases. 
1502 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1485 
George Schatzki unleashed perhaps the most scathing indict-
ment of the quality of union representation in a 1975 article ques-
tioning the continuing viability of the exclusivity principle.70 He 
argued that exclusivity based on majority choice subjects individ-
ual workers to representatives they do not want. 71 He contends 
that a representative controlled by a simple majority may be 
unresponsive to the needs of individual members and may pro-
mote grievances only selectively, thereby fostering both worker 
apathy concerning union affairs and worker dissatisfaction with 
employment conditions. Ultimately, this may cause wildcat 
strikes. 72 According to Schatzki, a system of union representation 
that jettisons exclusivity and allows individualized representa-
tion is feasible: 
The keystone of a model of collective bargaining which did not 
allow majority rule to determine the bargaining agent would be the 
principle that every employee could select his or her own represen-
tative, if any. No one would be represented by a labor organization 
unless it was actually selected by that individual. Second, the 
employer would be obligated to engage in good faith collective 
bargaining with each of the collective bargaining agents authorized 
by that employer's employees. Third, the unions could engage in 
coalition or cartel bargaining, and the employer would be required 
to bargain on that basis. 73 
Schatzki's proposal suffers from two polar problems. One 
difficulty, which he addresses but never quite dispels, is the possi-
ble return to individualized bargaining and the attendant crip-
pling of the worker's bargaining position. Schatzki questions the 
70. Schatzki, supra note 9. Schatzki's primary concerns are that individual workers 
have the opportunity to choose their own representative and control the handling of their 
grievances. 
71. Id. at 898. 
72. Id. at 915-18. 
73. Id. at 919 (footnote omitted). Schatzki acknowledges a number of objections to 
his suggestions; he always responds with the caveat that his predictions are speculative, 
id. at 920. His caveat makes it impossible to criticize his various defenses or to challenge 
his conclusion: 
On balance, it is not clear to me that the possible drawbacks of abandoning 
the exclusive representation model for collective bargaining in our country would 
outweigh the benefits which would result. The proposal would give individual work-
ers considerably more protection to vindicate their own interests. In the process, it 
is possible - perhaps likely - that unions would be more democratic, collective 
bargaining would at least deal with more of the employees' problems and desires, 
unions would be more responsive to individuals' grievances .... Hopefully, this 
Article has at least made the idea of nonexclusive collective bargaining something 
reasonable and worthy of further exploration. 
Id. at 938. 
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likelihood of such an occurrence, but he concedes the possibility.;~ 
If Schatzki is right, and labor would not in fact be weakened, a 
competing concern becomes troublesome. If labor retains its bar-
gaining strength under multiple representation, the real burden 
of nonexclusive representation must fall on the employer.75 While 
it may in some sense be just for unions that have failed to repre-
sent all their members adequately to bear the consequences of 
competition for worker'affiliations and affections, no equity justi-
fies punishing the employer. Nonetheless, Schatzki's proposal 
could force management to face multiple, perhaps irreconcilable, 
demands from several unions representing workers doing the 
same jobs, and to risk seriatim strikes each time a contract is 
renewed. Why penalize employers for the historical shortcomings 
of an exclusive representative? 
While Wellington and Schatzki want to change the legal 
framework in which unions operate, others have suggested less 
drastic methods of encouraging pluralistic influences in union 
decisions. One solution is for union leaders to accept political 
opposition within their ranks. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman are the 
foremost proponents of the argument that unions can effectively 
serve their members by offering rival slates of candidates during 
elections of union officers.76 Ideally, Lipset would like all unions 
to replicate the two-party political structure of the International 
Typographical Union (ITU). But the conditions preserving the 
ITU's two-party system77 appear, even to Lipset, to be unique to 
74. Id. at 930-32. Schatzki feels that any loss of economic strength that labor might 
suffer would be outweighed by increased responsiveness of the workers' representatives. 
Id. at 932. While I share Schatzki's desire for responsive representation, I believe it can 
be obtained without a substantial sacrifice of economic power. See Sections III and IV 
infra. 
75. Schatzki suggests that, for several reasons, collective bargaining with nonexclu-
sive representatives will not disadvantage employers: (1) an employer may be able to 
settle first with a weak union, thereby establishing the wage rates and working conditions 
for all employees, id. at 929, but see id. at 936; (2) an employer simply may not be any 
worse off bargaining with many, rather than a single or a few unions, id. at 937; (3) since 
employees will be more satisfied with more responsive representatives, reduced wildcat 
activity will offset the cost of multiple negotiations, id. Because I am skeptical about the 
advisability of completely abandoning exclusivity, I look to another solution to the prob-
lem of inadequate union representation. See Section ill infra. 
76. S. LIPsET, M. Thow, & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INSIDE PoLmcs OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956) [hereinafter cited as LIPSETJ. See J: 
SEIDMAN, supra note 14, where the author argues that a "loyal opposition" of union mem-
bers is required to insure democracy within unions. Seidman would accept either a politi-
cal party or a faction as the "loyal opposition." Id. at 38. 
77. Among the more significant conditions cited by Lipset are the homogeneous 
population of the ITU, LIPSET, supra note 76, at 414-17, the lack of serious wage differen-
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that union. 78 Perhaps for that reason, perhaps because the bene-
fits of autocracy are hard to relinquish, no other union leadership 
has tried to institutionalize a loyal opposition. Either way, the 
failure of union leaders to embrace a two-party system suggests 
that leadership accountability to union members cannot be 
achieved through voluntary imitations of the ITU political struc-
ture. Moreover, the two-party system may not be the best insur-
ance that union leaders will bargain effectively for the members. 
For example, Lipset points out one deleterious effect of the ITU's 
two-party system:"During all contract negotiations the opposi-
tion party carefully prepares the way for the next election. It puts 
forward greater demands than the administration believes it can 
gain from the employer. The opposition also criticizes the admin-
istration's handling of various grievance cases."79 That approach 
may enhance the standing of the opposition, but it may not im-
prove the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated 
by the incumbents. so 
The arguments of Wellington, Schatzki, and Lipset demon-
strate that the modern scholarly debate about how unions operate 
seeks not to undermine unions as an institution, but to expand 
the rights of workers within their unions. More modest proposals 
demonstrate the same positive concern. For instance, some sug-
gest requiring unions to submit all contract proposals and modifi-
cations to the membership for ratification before the union lead-
ers negotiate with management.81 However, like the more compli-
cated proposals, this option offers little solace to interest groups, 
because it still pits small group interests against the general 
membership. Furthermore, unless interest groups have the oppor-
tunity and the ability to express their views to the membership, 
tials among the workers, id. at 162, the high prestige of the profession (which means that 
by being a union official one does not significantly raise one's prestige above that of other 
union members), id. at 243, and the union structure which limits competition between 
printers in different cities and puts greater emphasis on officials for small units of printers, 
id. at 411-13. 
78. Id. at 462. 
79. Id. at 332. 
80. In addition, public bickering between the parties could allow management to 
manipulate the bargaining process by rejecting the incumbent's demands on the ground 
that an opposition victory at the polls will subject the employer to contradictory, and thus 
very expensive, bargaining demands during the next contract negotiations. 
81. See Simkin, Refusals to Ratify Contracts, in TRADE UNION GOVERNMENT AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 107 (J. Seidman ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as TRADE UNION 
GOVERNMENT]; Lahne, Union Constitutions and Collective Bargaining Procedures, id. at 
167-97. 
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ratification would be little more than an echo of the leadership's 
position. 82 Even if a faction temporarily blocks ratification, its 
interest may not gain recognition on the final agreement. 83 For 
example, the 1978 United Mineworkers contract, which was fi-
nally approved by membership vote after two abortive attempts, 
did not materially improve the position of older retirees, even 
though those former workers enjoyed substantial rank and file 
support.84 
Without a duty to negotiate with the dissenting members, 
nonratification may not prompt the union leadership to respond 
to interest group concerns at all. fu a seminar on union govern-
ment, a number of well-known scholars, mediators, and practi-
tioners commented on the effects of nonratification: 
A: The rejection of a tentative agreement recommended by a 
union official is a rejection of the union officer as a political 
leader, and as a result he may ... come to the next meeting 
and suggest that the company not increase its offer [so that 
his image will not suffer]. 
B: I have had responsible union leaders, after the rank and file 
have turned down a tentative agreement, tell me that we 
cannot improve the offer, if we expect them to exercise lead-
ership in the future. 
C: The union professional . . . met privately with the manage-
ment person and worked out the entire deal, but was afraid 
the membership would reject it. So the two professionals 
called in [a] mediator privately and told him of the problem 
and of the deal they had worked out. They went through the 
play-acting of negotiations, reached an impasse, called in the 
mediator officially, and had him come up with the deal which 
the two principals had worked out privately in advance. [The 
82. The effective ratification requirement would have to provide dissidents with ac-
cess to the membership prior to the ratification vote. Similarly, a ratification provision 
would need to guarantee a reasonable time period between announcement of the proposed 
agreement and the ratification vote to allow dissidents the opportunity to campaign. The 
UMW constitution, for example, requires a ten-day discussion period. 
83. One might argue that, in addition to providing for member ratification of bargain-
ing agreements, the law should further protect economic interest groups by requiring 
unions to subject all decisions and procedures to the approval of the majority of members. 
Such a requirement would insure that the leadership has satisfied a majority, no matter 
what the issue. Of course, the satisfied majority would vary in membership each time a 
decision was made, depending on the issue involved. It is hard to see, however, how this 
proposal improves the position of economic interest groups who constitute numerical 
minorities. Also, Alice Cook has pointed out at least one example where, when a union 
attempted to operate by majority rule to increase membership participation, the member-
ship's contributions were limited to nonpolicy decisions. A. CooK, UNION DEMOCRACY: 
PRACTICE AND IDEAL 39-77 (1963). 
84. N.Y. Times, Mar~h 25, 1978, at 1, col. 6. 
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union committee recommended it to the membership who 
accepted it.)85 
Moreover, once a majority of workers have rejected an entire 
contract proposal, management has more influence upon future 
union decisions. An employer may find that stalling in subse-
quent negotiations will destroy the union. Alternatively, manage-
ment may cooperate with the union leadership to reduce worker 
support for a dissident faction. Employers typically prefer to work 
with the existing union leadership, who recognize the value of 
quick compromise and cooperation, rather than bargain with a 
more demanding, unpredictable, insurgent leadership. 
Other commentators have argued that outlawing the union 
shop would make unions more responsive to their members be-
cause of the combined threats of decertification and refusal by 
nonmembers to support union proposals for concerted action. 80 
Financial agreements requiring all bargaining unit members to 
pay the equivalent of union dues and initiation fees, as provided 
by the Taft-Hartley Act,87 could eliminate any "free rider" prob-
lem. 
Nevertheless, serious drawbacks plague this proposal. First, 
workers who pay dues but are not required to join the union may 
85. Simkin, supra note 81, at 140, 141, 142. Compare the observations of E.A, Ross: 
It is interesting to observe how the procedures for rank-and-file participation 
in the wage bargain have increasingly become tools for the use of the leadership, 
Originally intended to implement the final authority of the rank and file, they have 
gradually undergone a subtle metamorphosis, until they have become a means of 
conditioning the membership, communicating indirectly with the employer, and 
guarding the flank against rival leadership ... the procedures originally designed 
to guarantee control by the rank and file have become devices for control of the rank 
and file .... 
The formal rationale of the union is to augment the economic welfare of its 
members; but a more vital institutional objective - survival and growth of the 
organization - will take precedence whenever it comes into conflict with the formal 
purpose. 
Ross, The Trade Union as a Wage-Fixing Institution, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 582-87 (1974) 
(emphasis in original). 
86. Theoretically, a union-shop clause requires that a worker join the union within a 
stated time after commencing employment. In fact, the union-shop clause may only 
condition continued employment on payment of dues and initiation fees. See§ 8(b)(l)(A) 
of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1976). Commentators agree, however, that few 
workers in union shops are aware of their option to refrain from membership and merely 
meet those financial obligations. E.g., Wellington, Union Fines, supra note 14, at 1051-
52. 
87. Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 
U.S. 734, 742 (1963). 
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not feel the same loyalty to their coworkers as do union members. 
This loyalty is a socially important by-product of union member-
ship in part because it enables the union to use economic weapons 
more effectively. Second, membership requirements promote 
participation in union affairs - if one is not a union member 
there is little incentive to change union policies.88 Insofar as un-
ions are the accepted vehicle for advancing the diverse interests 
of workers, an active,89 broad-based membership is the only insur-
ance against permanent control by a few labor bureaucrats. 
All of the scholarly criticism I have discussed so far has re-
lated to the union as a representative in contract negotiations. 
Another side of union life has also fueled attacks on the adequacy 
of union representation: a union's duty to represent an individual 
employee who alleges that the employer has breached its con-
tract. Discussion of this issue is particularly noteworthy because 
many of the more perceptive critics and judges have proposed 
schemes that improve only the grievance aspect of union repre-
serttation00 and have ignored the broader issues of individual and 
interest group influence on the formation of general union policy. 
But the distinction between contract negotiation and grievance 
settlement may be illusory: Each grievance presents an opportun-
ity to refine or expand a contract term, albeit in a more limited 
fashion than during contract negotiation, and settlements are 
often tantamount to amendments to the collective bargaining 
agreement.91 Although the intensity of institutional and individ-
88. Employees who do not join a union "would not be entitled to attend union meet-
ings, vote upon ratification of agreements negotiated by the union, or have a voice in the 
internal affairs of the union." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) 
(comment of union vice president approved by NLRB). 
89. Union members are notorious for failing to attend union meetings, but researchers 
have found that turnout is significantly improved when vital economic decisions are on 
the agenda. See TRADE UNION GOVERNMENT, supra note 81, at 20-22; A. CooK, supra note 
83, at 210-11. 
90. See THE DU'rY OF FAm REPRESENTATION, supra note 36, in which eight contributors 
discuss the duty of fair representation as if the only significant concerns were the individ-
ual grievant's access to representation for grievance and arbitration and the union's dili-
gence before and during arbitration hearings. See also Clark, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. REv. lll9 (1973); Feller, A General Theory of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663 (1973). Cf. Leffler, Piercing 
the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance 
Handling, 1979 U. Ju.. L.F. 35, arguing that there is a significant difference between the 
contract-negotiation and administration obligations, but accepting uncritically the sim-
plistic proposition that the workers' interest in grievance handling is greater, and more 
deserving of protection, than their concerns about the ongoing economic terms which 
govern the workplace. 
91. See Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Fune-
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ual interests may vary between negotiation and implementation, 
it does not ineluctably follow that representation of group inter-
ests and individual interests may be assigned discretely to the 
contract negotiation and contract administration functions of a 
union. 
A good example of the problems with proposals that see un-
ions through the narrow lens of grievance resolution may be found 
in Clyde Summers's suggestion that federal law accommodate the 
postnegotiation needs of individual employees through "direct 
recognition of the individual's right under the contract."02 His 
suggestion grants each employee three rights: the right to invoke 
contractual grie· ranee-arbitration machinery if the union refuses 
to do so, the rii;ht to participate in the arbitration hearing on an 
equal footing with the union and management, 93 and the right not 
to be bound by a grievance settlement without consent. 94 Where 
an individual worker protests a union decision not to pursue a 
grievance or not to seek arbitration, or questions the union's abil-
ity to present the best case, the Summers model is a good one. 
The grievance-arbitration machinery would not be flooded by 
frivolous disputes, because employees must initiate and fund 
their individual claims. If an employee refuses to accept a union-
approved settlement, the refusal would only trigger an additional 
discussion, higher level grievance negotiations, or perhaps arbi-
tration. Since the employee bears all costs, except where the 
tions of Industrial Disobedience, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 750, 802-04 (1973). On the distinction 
between a union's duties when negotiating a collective bargaining agreement as compared 
to administering one, see Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of the Intl. 
Longshoremen's Union, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.1974). The Railway Labor Act acknowledges 
these two stages. The R.L.A. provides for resolution of major collective bargaining dis-
putes through federal district court injunctions and through voluntary arbitration before 
the National Mediation Board, 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (b) (1976). Minor disputes, those 
involving the meaning or application of a particular contract provision to a specific situa• 
tion, are resolved by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which has primary juris-
diction. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976). 
92. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 410 n.188. 
93. An individual member or group of members may enforce this right by initiating 
arbitration or by intervening in arbitration between the employer and the union to protect 
interests directly affected by the outcome. 
94. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 398-410. To a certain extent, 
Summers's insistence on employees' rights to control their own grievances is but another 
form of Wellington's concern for employee-community expectations. The right to reject 
or accept settlement of a grievance is tied to the expectations the worker derives from 
the collective bargaining agreement, the folklore of the workplace, and perhaps most 
importantly, the support of coworkers and the union. Conversely, the resolution of a 
particular grievance affects other workers' expectations by interpreting a shared contract. 
See notes 57-68 supra and accompanying text. 
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worker prevails and the union refused to seek arbitration solely 
because of doubts about the outcome, 95 employees will not seek 
arbitration casually. When the union seeks arbitration, interven-
tion by an individual whose interests are directly affected should 
not require many additional evidentiary presentations. In gen-
eral, the costs of the Summers approach to settling the grievances 
of individual workers are minimal. 
Unfortunately, Summers mistakenly assumed that his pro-
posal, with minor modifications, could be generalized to permit 
employee groups with a common interest distinct from the 
union's to participate in grievance settlements. 96 Under such a 
plan, a rival union could advance its own dreams of a takeover 
by offering financial support to grieving dissidents sympathetic 
to its goals. If the union leadership panicked and began to back 
every arguable grievance, management would lose its traditional 
reliance on union judgment to screen spurious complaints. Fur-
thermore, the proposal might backfire. An arbitrator facing hon-
est grievance disputes between a minority interest group, the 
union leadership, and the employer might accord the union inter-
pretation inordinate weight simply because it represented a sort 
of middle ground. 97 Even more appalling is the possibility that an 
arbitrator might choose to maximize personal prospects for future 
employment by agreeing to the interpretation of the two powerful 
groups, casting aside the seemingly less significant view of the 
interest group. 98 
The most ambitious proposal for considering substantive 
interests during grievance settlements expands judicial review 
of how unions settle employee grievances.99 Andrew Levy argues 
95. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 403. 
96. See Summers, What Constitutes Fair Representation?, supra note 42, at 60-83; 
Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 407 n.182. 
97. A difficult problem could arise using the Summers approach. If an arbitrator's 
award on a seniority issue is favorable to the position taken by a dissident employee group, 
what happens when the group files an unfair labor practice charge, alleging a violation of 
the duty of fair representation against the union, and seeks recovery of the costs of the 
arbitration? Cf. NLRB v. Local 396, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (court upheld Board discretion to award legal fees to workers 
in a successful suit to force the union to pursue their grievances in arbitration). 
98. This outcome would be even more attractive to the arbitrator if the union and 
the employer agree on the proper interpretation, as frequently occurs when dissidents are 
denied access to arbitration by their union. See Schatzki, supra note 9, at 908 n.28. 
Summers appears to endorse e union's actions so long as the union's position is based on 
the contract and the union acts consistently, regardless of the merits of the grievance in 
question. See Summers, What Constitutes Fair Representation?, supra note 42, at 72-75. 
99. Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Limitation on Union Control of 
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that, be.cause plaintiffs find it too difficult to prove bad faith 
and discriminatory motive in duty-of-fair-representation cases, 
the courts should subject union settlements to one of two new 
standards of representation. Under the first standard, courts 
would evaluate a settlement as they would evaluate an arbitral 
decision: if the union's decision failed to draw its essence from the 
language of the collective agreement, the court would order arbi-
tration. Under the second, more complex standard, courts would 
think like arbitrators: whether or not a settlement is arguably 
justified by the contract's language, if a court thinks that an 
arbitrator would deem it unacceptable, then the court would re-
quire it to be arbitrated.100 Levy favors the latter approach, al-
though he admits that the courts might have difficulty making 
anticipatory determinations of matters traditionally reserved for 
the arbitrator .101 . 
The desire for neutral, third-party review of settlements un-
satisfactory to the grievant is understandable, but the difficulties 
with Levy's proposal suggest the reasons why it has not been 
adopted. It is far more cumbersome than Summers's elegant and 
self-executing scheme for giving employees control over their 
grievances. Moreover, the Levy plan requires the federal courts 
to screen all claims - whether frivolous or meritorious, whether 
from individual grievants or from·a group. The added burden for 
court dockets is difficult to justify, particularly since the federal 
judiciary believes the NLRB and arbitrators more able to evalu-
ate workplace disputes. 102 
Further, any time a judge ordered arbitration pursuant to the 
Levy plan, the arbitrator would be forced into an insufferable 
position. How may an arbitrator pretend to be impartial, knowing 
that a judge had, notwithstanding the opinions of the union and 
management, found a grievant's complaint legitimate? The effort 
would be particularly painful for an arbitrator who was familiar 
with the industry, the tenor of disputes, and the general complex-
ion of settlements. Even where an arbitrator was asked only to 
mediate, the mediation dialogue might be hamstrung by the arbi-
Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1970). 
100. Id. at 1056-59. 
101. Id. at 1058-59. 
102. See cases cited in note 60 supra. Levy believes that since courts developed the 
duty of fair representation, they should function as a prearbitrator. However, the courts 
have derived the duty from statutory interpretation. The judicial interpretations, like the 
statutes themselves, then serve as guides for administrative and arbitral bodies. 
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trator's knowledge that a federal court had already defined the 
contours of a reasonable settlement.103 Unlike arbitrators under 
the Summers plan, who might know that a settlement agreeable 
to both union and management had reached arbitration at the 
insistence of a grievant, Levy's arbitrators would know that the 
arbitration was forced by a higher authority. 104 
Finally, I question Levy's suggestion that grievance settfe-
ments may be consistent with a collective bargaining agreement 
but unac9eptable to an arbitrator. Levy does not cite any areas 
of labor law in which judicial evaluations of a contract claim 
differ from arbitral evaluations. And such examples may be diffi-
cult to find given the differences in contract language and the 
relative paucity of judicial and arbitral decisions dealing with 
similar work issues. In one obvious area where such comparison 
might be made - adjustment of seniority rights - cursory re-
search reveals that judicial acceptance of union leadership deter-
minations is mirrored in arbitrators' resolutions of such dis-
putes.105 
This discussion of worker discontent and scholarly concern 
only pricks the surface of contemporary worries over worker rights 
within unions. Of course, mere dissatisfaction with unions does 
not indict the labor movement. Workers ~nd their unions must 
work together or face employer autocracy. Nevertheless, we 
should see dissatisfaction as a· signal that, within the broad 
framework of union representation, the law might find better 
ways to accommodate the desires of all union members. 
. . 
103. Cf. Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 
(1976): "When one's own representative who has been willing to assume that status pro-
claims a lack of merit [to the grievant's claim] it is indeed likely to be a coup de grace 
to the claim." 
104. A similar criticism may apply to an arbitrator's award made after judicial 
screening of the settlement proposed by the employer and the union. Knowing that a 
federal judge has approved a particular resolution in advance, an arbitrator might avoid 
the very award that seems mandated by the contract. On the other hand, an arbitrator 
issuing such an award - as compared to mediating a dispute - may feel that as long as 
a court has predicted that a certain resolution is acceptable there is no reason to pay any 
attention to the court's feeling that the resolution is unreasonable. This latter instance 
would yield a curious situation in which an arbitrator determines that an award draws 
its essence from the contract and, on postarbitral review of that award, a federal court is 
bound to agree. Thus, there is no value in influencing the process prior to arbitration. 
105. I am not aware of any studies comparing judicial and arbitral evaluations of 
union resolution of competing economic interests involving similar work issues and con-
tract language. 
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C. Majority Rule as a Value in the Workplace 
The contours of any accommodation must, however, take 
into account a pivotal concept in labor law - union decisions by 
majority rule. 108 Generally, Congress and the courts have pro-
ceeded on the utilitarian assumption that majority rule is the 
system most likely to maximize overall worker welfare. 107 The 
underlying assumption is that all individual workers should 
weigh equally in the social balance. This application of the Ben-
thamite justification for liberal democracy is appealing in part 
because it is familiar in American political life. rns 
But majority rule, like most simple principles, suffers from 
imperfections if applied absolutely. It ignores intensities of indi-
vidual worker preferences, and it is precisely the intensity of these 
preferences which may vary greatly in intensity, as we have 
seen.109 For instance, workers with preschool children may have 
a strong interest in securing day-care facilities as a benefit pro-
vision during contract negotiations. Without such facilities, they 
may be compelled to leave work to care for their children. On 
the other hand, the majority of workers may not have small 
children and thus may not derive any benefit at all from a day-
care center. If the majority votes its self-interest, it will always 
defeat the day-care center, even though it may gain only a few 
cents per hour in higher wages by doing so. The intensity of the 
minority's preference and the mildness of the majority's prefer-
ence are not reflected under a simple one person, one vote system. 
The theoretical objections are exaggerated in the union con-
text, where members' participatory rights appear more formal 
than effective. Workers rarely have the right to participate in 
106. For a historical discussion of the majority principle, see Schreiber, supra note 
8. But see McConnell, supra note 8. 
107. Justice Marshall best expressed this assumption: 
Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining . • . is the principle of 
majority rule . • . . In establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to 
secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective strength and 
bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals 
or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority. 
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 60, 62 
(1975) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co,, 388 
U.S. 175 (1967). 
108. For a discussion of why majority rule is peculiar to American labor laws, see 
Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV, L. REV, 
1394, 1426-27 (1971). 
109. See text at notes 27-50 supra. 
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decisions to proceed with or settle grievances they have filed, 1111 
or even to influence union conduct in arbitration hearings. 111 In-
creasingly, national staffs of union leaders negotiate nationwide 
collective bargaining agreements that do not benefit from any 
membership discussion. 112 Furthermore, workers generally as-
sume that the union leadership would retaliate against any at-
tempts to participate in the manner contemplated by the 
Landrum-Griffin Act.113 The law may not be responsible for 
worker apathy, 114 but at least it should give nonapathetic workers 
the right to participate in union decisions and effectively protect 
them from retaliation when they do participate. 115 
Realizing that the outweighed interests of the majority do 
not always maximize worker welfare, modern collective bargain-
ing embraces several exceptions to the theory that majority rule 
is a prerequisite to effective union representation. These excep-
110. Participatory opportunities for affected workers may be lacking when Title VII 
processes are used as well. See Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978); Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 
832 (9th Cir. 1976); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976), 
affd. sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
837 (1978). 
111. Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (because a worker relies 
so heavily on union representation during arbitration, the arbitration decision does not 
bind the worker if the union breaches its duty of fair representation to that worker). But 
see, e.g., NLRB v. Local 396, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
112. See, e.g., Davey v. Fitzsimmons, 413 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1976), discussed in 
text at notes 48-50 supra. 
113. The fear of retaliation is not irrational. Wellington noted in 1958 that unions 
may have good reason to discriminate against dissenters who exercise participatory rights, 
since those employees represent a threat to the union's political power. Wellington, Union 
Democracy, supra note 14, at 1334. See also J. SEIDMAN, supra note 14, at 28. As Welling-
ton predicted, the Landrum-Griffin Act has not diminished this potential. See Leslie, 
supra note 22, at 1315. For a distressing example of this point, see Newman v. CWA, 97 
L.R.R.M. 2606 (2d Cir. 1978), discussed in text at note 51 supra. 
114. See Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 44, 48, 52 (1958). See generally Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14, 
at 1330. For a generally positive evaluation of Landrum-Griffin's effect, see P. TAFr, 
RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNMENT (1975). 
115. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, tit. VII, § 704(a), 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976)) (making it an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer or labor organization to discriminate against any union member or other 
employee who "has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter"). But see 
Garret v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976), 
holding that an employer did not violate § 704(a) in firing a black worker who peacefully 
presented complaints of discrimination to the employer's manager rather than to her 
supervisor. 
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tions also cast doubt on the corollary notion that only through 
majority rule can a union present the united front that is alleg-
edly necessary for effective negotiation with management. For 
example, groups of employees sometimes circumvent the prefer-
ence of the majority by bargaining as isolated "work groups." 
Often such negotiations convince a supervisor to grant noncon-
tractual privileges to increase productivity. Such factional bar-
gaining, which may also be camouflaged as grievance settlement, 
"is rarely considered to derogate from union authority. Indeed, 
the union is normally aware of tacit agreements reached, and 
these agreements are not normally incorporated into the collec-
tive bargaining agreements."116 
Of course, one might say that because the union leadership 
knows of, and tacitly approves, work-group negotiations, they 
are not pure exceptions to majority rule. Yet such reasoning can-
not explain the continued presence of union-disapproved "wild-
cat activity" by bargaining-unit members, nor can it explain the 
forced presence of minority representatives in contract negotia-
tions concerning employment discrimination. But neither 
phenomenon has destroyed the unions. 
Wildcat activity is clear evidence of intraunion dissension, 
but the unions have retained their bargaining strength even with 
a less than united front. 117 Employers expect that their union 
contracts assure uninterrupted production and that the union 
will quell any worker dissatisfaction by enforcing its rules against 
unauthorized activity.118 But when those employer expectations 
are disappointed, the number and scope of collective bargaining 
agreements does not appear to diminish. 119 There is no evidence 
116. Atleson, supra note 91, at 792. 
117. On the utility and rationality of wildcats, see Atleson, supra note 91, nt 754-55, 
Indeed, issues in wildcats may be of little interest to union leaders even though rnnk-nnd-
file workers take them seriously. In wildcat strikes, employees may be protesting joint 
employer-union action, see, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community 
Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), or union acquiescence in employer decisions supported 
by collective bargaining provisions, see Atleson, supra note 91, at 769. 
118. Wildcat action occurs despite the employer's right to retaliate through dis-
charges; and despite contract provisions linking pension fund contributions to producti• 
vity. Atleson has suggested that employees represented by weak unions are in n double 
bind. They will not be well-protected in grievance processing and will be more easily sub• 
jected to discharge should they engage in wildcat activity, Atleson, supra note 91, at 816, 
119. The difficulties in negotiating a 1977 Mine Workers' contract do not diminish 
this argument. The workers' difficulties were,-in part, caused by the mine owners' previous 
insistence on arbitrating evecy dispute rather than engaging in informal settlement nt the 
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that wildcat activity influences an employer's decision to accept 
employee organization. This suggests that effective collective 
bargaining does not always require a united front of workers. 120 
Divided worker representation121 in confrontations over em-
ployment discrimination furnishes an even more telling exception 
to the majority principle. Both employers and unions have per-
mitted representatives of protected minority groups to bargain 
over new contract terms and to appear in arbitration hearings. 122 
Such minority group representation has occasionally exposed in-
consistent labor positions on certain issues, but it has still allowed 
satisfactory dispute resolution. 123 Admittedly, the threat of litiga-
tion may motivate labor and management to permit multi-
interest representation, 124 but the parties' motives for acknowl-
site and by the UMW leadership's historic inability to control the rank and file. Even after 
rank-and-file rejection of the bargaining council-recommended contract, mine owners 
continued to negotiate. Thus, the owners must have perceived that the benefits of a 
nationwide agreement outweighed dissatisfaction based on the union leadership's inabil-
ity to control rank-and-file workera. For a discussion of these negotiations see Horvitz, 
What's Happening in Collective Bargaining?, I.R.R.A., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1978 ANNUAL 
MEETING 453 (1978). 
120. It could, of course, be argued that employers tolerate wildcat activity only to the 
extent that there is no significant business loss or that unions are liable for damages in 
connection with employer business loss. The extent of union liability merely defines the 
boundaries of employer-accepted nonmajority conduct; it does not undermine the conclu-
sion that nonmajority activity can be consistent with collective bargaining. Cf. Atleson, 
supra note 91, at 756-58 (wildcats are frequently not intended to alter institutional ar-
rangements, but are grounded in a desire to have work problems taken seriously). See also 
Schatzki, supra note 10, at 917 (wildcatting helps weaker factions of employees air their 
views). 
121. The terms "divided worker representation" and "multi-interest representation" 
mean that union spokespersons do not present the only worker position on disputed 
issues, and that protected minority groups have separate representation. 
122. Minority groups may be represented by selected counsel or by the EEOC, with 
the EEOC always considering itself as also representing the public interest. Sometimes 
more than one agency representative of minority groups may be present. See Local 189, 
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
919 (1970). 
123. Frequently, the employer and the union appear to be on one side of the table, 
with the EEOC and minority groups on the other. In these circumstances, the interests 
of the employer and union can never be identical, and all parties to the negotiation must 
consider each opponent's demands from the perspective of self-interest. 
124. The threat of litigation or a decree guarantees that the EEOC participant will 
not be ignored and that the minority interests are represented at the bargaining table and 
incorporated into the terms of the agreement. At times the attempt to avoid litigation 
through conciliation may not work, as in Kaplan v. Local 659, State Employees, 7 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 894 (C.D. Cal. 1973), affd., 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975), where the 
union had negotiated a conciliation decree with the Department of Justice concerning the 
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edging diversity in the labor force do not detract from my present 
point.125 Effective bargaining and contract enforcement do not 
depend completely upon a single union bargaining stance dic-
tated by majority choice, and they are not necessarily under-
mined by the participation of special interest groups in negotia-
tion and arbitration. 126 
employment of ethnic minorities. Plaintiff, a female, was not covered by the conciliation 
agreement, but recovered anyway, on the district court's finding of a pattern of discrimi-
nation against women. Similarly, in EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973), 
affd. in part and remanded in part, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974), the court held that a 
consent decree mandating remedial action in the areas of wages, goals, timetables, trans-
fers, and promotions, did not insulate the company from private litigation. In McAleer v. 
AT&T, 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976), the court held that a consent decree requiring 
preferential promotions was not a defense to an action for damages by a man who was 
passed over for a promotion because of his gender. But see EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 
1022, 1055 n.34 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977) (Title VII recognizes a 
narrow.but complete immunity for employer conduct undertaken in good faith reliance 
on a written interpretation by the EEOC, and a consent decree qualifies as such.). 
125. In fact, outside the context of employment discrimination, there is support for 
the view that grievance arbitration proceedings will not be destroyed if the grievant, as 
well as the union and management, participate in arbitration hearings. Multi-interest 
arbitration has been ordered in duty-of-fair-representation cases, with the union responsi-
ble for paying the fees of the grievant's independent counsel. See NLRB v. Local 396, Intl. 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); cf. Scott 
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1974) (where union was held liable 
for grievant's legal fees incurred at trial, not during arbitration, when grievant received 
no relief from his employer and no help from the union despite his good-faith effort to 
invoke the contract's grievanc~ procedure). Even in the absence of a breach of the duty 
of fair representation, the grievant has been made a party to arbitration proceedings when 
the arbitrator has determined that his inclusion would be advantageous as a procedural 
matter. See Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Serva., Inc., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 
1976). These courts appear to recognize' that postarbitration access to separate counsel 
may come too late. But see Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Laney v. Ford Motor Co., 95 L.R.R.M. 2002 (D. Minn. 
1977) (employees alleging conspiracy may not have independent representation at con-
tractually required proceedings). Some unions may offer separate representation to the 
grievants. See Crenshaw v. Allied Chem. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 594, 600 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
But see Ensina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1971) (union could 
offer to take case to arbitration on condition employee pays costs). 
126. The presence of special interest groups at the bargaining table appears to be 
gaining acceptance in grievance and arbitration hearings. Following the Supreme Court's 
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (an adverse arbitral 
decision will not bar a timely Title VII claim but under certain conditions the arbitrator's 
determination may be given "great weight" by the federal courts), some employers and 
unions have negotiated collective bargaining procedures for handling employment dis-
crimination grievances. A contractual provision for separate grievance representation was 
suggested by two of the Court's reasons for finding traditional arbitration proceedings 
inadequate for final resolution of employment discrimination claims under Title VII. 
First, the Court was concerned that in an arbitration hearing the grievant would not 
benefit from the procedures authorized by Congress in Title VII. 415 U.S. at 55-59. A 
contract provision which replicates the procedural regularity afforded complainants in 
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Because majority rule has proved an imperfect means of in-
corporating multifarious worker interests into union decisions, 
groups of disgruntled workers have turned to the courts to vindi-
cate their interests. In class action litigation, courts have recog-
nized that unions, although they theoretically represent the inter-
ests of all workers, may not be the proper class representative for 
a bargaining unit. In Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 127 
a class of black workers sued their employer and union (the 
Brotherhood), seeking to realign seniority rights. The court held 
that white employees were indispensible parties to the action, 
even though the black employees were alleging that the defen-
dant union supported the discriminatory seniority provisions to 
the advantage of white employees. In the court's view, the union 
had . 
an equal duty to represent those members comprising the class 
which plaintiff represents as well as the white employees whose 
interest would be realigned by ariy order granting relief to plaintiff. 
It thus appears that the white employees' interest is not the same 
as the Brotherhood's, and that the Brotherhood cannot fairly and 
adequately represent the interest of the class.128 
The situation is the same when a union has attempted to act 
as a plaintiff class representative in challenging employment 
practices. In Communications Workers of America v. New York 
Telephone Co., 129 the court refused to certify the Communication 
Workers of America as representative of a class of all nonsupervi-
sory employees in a suit alleging discriminatory disability insur-
ance coverage. It reasoned that the union's interest was not coex-
federal court would necessarily include the right to separate representation. Second, the 
Court recognized that in discrimination arbitrations the union's interest might differ from 
that of the grievant, particularly where the issue is one of contract interpretation. 415 U.S. 
at 58 n.19. The Gardner-Denver decision speaks to the issue of "deferral" particularly 
when the arbitrator decides a factual issue. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. Multi-party representa-
tion, including independent counsel, for the grievants, would insure a complete airing of 
the adverse positions. For examples of trilateral arbitration provisions, see Basic Vegeta-
bles Prod., Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.); Hammerman & Rogoff, The Union 
Role in Title VII Enforcement, CIVIL RIGHTS Dm., Spring, 1975, at 22. For an evaluation 
of the role of arbitration in private employment discirmination cases, see Meltzer, Labor 
Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties' Process and the Public's Purposes, 43 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 724 (1976). 
127. 51 F.R.D. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1970). 
128. 51 F.R.D. at 305 (citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)). See 
also Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 54, 61 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (distinguishing 
Banks on the ground that the union in Sagers was not "vigorously" representing the white 
employees' interests). 
129. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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tensive with that of the class, because disability insurance is often 
a subject of collective bargaining.130 
The courts have also questioned whether unions seeking to 
intervene on behalf of a class of workers can adequately represent 
that class. In EEOC v. AT&T, 131 the Communications Workers 
(CWA) sought to intervene as a party plaintiff after entry of a 
nationwide c<;msent decree to remedy sex discrimination. In re-
jecting the union's petition, the Third Circuit observed that the 
CWA's 
position as bargaining representative of all its members, both those 
aggrieved and the equally large, if not larger, number of those who 
are not adversely affected by, and indeed may to some degree 
benefit from, the alleged unlawful employment practices, clearly 
disqualifies it from acting in thi1;1 action as a class representative 
on behalf of the former group.132 
A union ruled by an unfettered majority cannot adequately 
represent the interests of all groups within it. The class action 
cases acknowledge this almost self-evident truth. And neither 
pure majority rule nor the facade of a united front is necessary 
130. Judge Tyler relied on two arguments. First, the judge cited Lynch v. Sperry 
~nd Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 84 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the court held that even ii' 
the potential conflict between the plaintiff union and individual plaintiffs were not so 
serious, the union could not be the proper class representative of individuals. See also 
International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Pree. 
Cas. 16 (N.D.W. Va. 1977). Second, Judge Tyler emphasized the "increasing number of 
Title VII cases in which a class of employees is suing its union as well as the employers." 
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 513 n.1. But see International Woodworkers v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 568 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1977), in which the Eighth Circuit refused to hold as a matter 
of law that a racially mixed union cannot be a class representative for black employees in 
a Title VII suit challenging employment practices. 
131. 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). 
132. 506 F.2d at 741. Judge Maris's comments were in response to the union's petition 
to intervene under Too. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(l); the petition under rule 24(a)(2) was also 
rejected, since CW A's-desire to protect its ability as a bargaining agent seemed more akin 
to the defendant's interest than to the plaintiffs'. But see EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167, 
173 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 9i5 (1978), in which the CWA attacked a consent 
decree to which it was not a party and was held to have standing to sue as the representa-
tive of its members, even though the union might have acted "inconsistently with the best 
interests of some of the persons whom they represent in the collective bargaining process." 
The decision does not necessarily represent a retreat from the doctrine that unions cannot 
adequately represent the interests of all members. CW A was intervening on behalf of 
white males whose interests would be adversely affected by the consent decree and who 
had not been represented when its terms were negotiated. At the same time, the original 
plaintiffs in the massive negotiations leading to the consent decree had adequately repre-
sented those union members whose interests were not being protected by the union. For 
an excellent discussion of the use of intervention in affirmative action litigation, see Jones, 
Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative 
Action, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31 (1979). 
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for effective worker representation. As we have seen, the modern 
labor world reflects its understanding of that reality by fashioning 
de facto exceptions to the basic principle of majority control. 
Thus, while that principle remains the cornerstone of union oper-
ations, room still remains to modify it whenever it bears too 
harshly upon the welfare of particular groups of workers. 
m. THE VETo PRoPosAL 
If we accept that the evidence of dissatisfaction with unions 
is substantial, and that majority rule need not absolutely govern 
union decisions, then a reevaluation of the relationship between 
~conomic interest groups and their exclusive representatives is in 
order. 133 Inspired by Wellington's perception that employee ex-
pectations are a legitimate guide for reviewing union decisions134 
and by Lipset's argument for organized internal opposition,135 I 
propose that workers having common economic concerns within 
unions be allowed to form interest groups, that unions be required 
to deal in good faith with each interest group, 136 and that the 
NLRB assert its jurisdiction to review disputed union decisions. 137 
Additionally, these interes~ groups should possess a limited right 
to veto decisions of the majority, to assure that union leadership 
will heed their concerns. 138 The interest-group-veto system would 
133. I have already explained the reasons for rejecting the Wellington, Lipset, and 
Schatzki proposals. See notes 56-80 supra and accompanying text. 
134. Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14. See note 59 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
135. LIPSET, supra note 76. 
136. Although the analogy is admittedly crude, it seems to me that, currently, eco-
nomic interest groups stand in somewhat the same relationship to their unions as labor 
did to management in 1935, and that these groups require legal intervention to protect 
their economic interests. Of course, the disputes between union leadership and their 
constitutents, unlike the antagonism between labor and management which stems from 
conflicting goals, is episodic and arises out of setting priorities for common goals. 
137. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., Disston Div.-Danville Works v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), 
is not a barrier. See note 159 infra. 
138. Interest groups composed of a majority of th~ membership would also possess 
the veto power. Although a political majority has access to legal tools and may use the 
political process to reprimand union leadership for unpopular decisions, practical experi-
ence suggests that these workers ought not to be foreclosed from using the veto since they 
often feel themselves tyrannized by a minority, are unaware of available legal supports, 
and are timorous of the political process. Moreover, a particularly intransigent minority 
should not be able to force a contract provision on an unwilling majority group, both of 
which are concerned about a particular issue. If the majority group were not able to 
exercise a veto in the initial vote, it would be possible for the minority to ratify the special 
provision and for a majority of all the voters to ratify the entire contract. Such a result 
would inequitably subordinate the majority interest to that of the minority. 
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encourage conflicting interest groups to resolve their differences 
before the union leadership negotiates with management. It thus 
would permit the union to maintain a united bargaining front, 
while enhancing the likelihood that the membership would ratify 
and adhere to the eventual agreement. 139 
In Subsection A, I offer a brief overview of the veto proposal, 
sketching its contours but deliberately leaving its texture impre-
cise. I hope that readers will be able to see quickly the manner 
in which the different sides of the proposal reflect and reinforce 
one another. In Subsection B, I share my conception of the pro-
posal's implementation by developing a detailed hypothetical 
that illustrates many of the advantages that interest group vetoes 
offer. Readers will thus have an opportunity to discuss the sys-
tem's inner workings, to criticize, and in searching for replies to 
their criticisms, to improve the proposal. Finally, in Subsection 
C, I discuss some of the veto proposal's special implications for 
NLRB review. 
A. An Overview of the Veto Proposal 
1. Local Meetings and Interest Group Certification 
Before negotiating with management, a national union 
would have to discuss its intended strategy and contract demands 
with the local membership. It would send representatives to 
meetings of every union local, long before the beginning of union-
management negotiations. At those meetings, members could ask 
questions and probe the leadership's position on any issue they 
thought important. Workers sharing a common economic interest 
who believed the union's position threatened that interest could 
raise their objections.140 If the meetings failed to satisfy them, 
such workers could organize, choose leaders, and ask the national 
leadership to certify them as an interest group. 
A certification· request ~eed contain only three things: 
1) The names of the group leaders, 
2) The common economic interest defining the group, and 
3) The contract negotiation issues on which the interest group 
disagrees with the union leadership position. 
139. Although one might assert that the union already has these incentives, the 
sources for dissatisfaction discussed in Section II supra suggest that the incentives are, 
at times, inadequate. 
140. If a union comprises only a small, homogeneous group of workers, then the veto 
proposal would probably be superfluous. However, for the same reason, the proposal would 
probably pose no serious problem to union efficiency in such a circumstance. 
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Within a fixed time of the application (perhaps two months), the 
national union leadership would have to decide whether to certify 
the interest group. If denied certification, 141 the interest groups 
could petition the NLRB. If the union granted certification, the 
interest group members would be assured a voice in the formula-
tion of contract demands. 142 
2. Intraunion Discussions and Searches for Compromise 
Interest groups would receive union funds to coordinate their 
activities. They would send representatives to the local meetings, 
where they would debate their disagreements with the union 
leadership. Locals throughout the union would be exposed to dif-
ferent perspectives on the broader goals of the union. The debate 
would encourage compromise solutions to the early problems and 
would furnish the leadership with guidelines for their negotiating 
teams. In the long run, the discussions would promote the twin 
ideals of leadership accountability and worker participation. 
3. Negotiations, Interest Group Closure, and First-Round 
Vetoes 
After considering what it had learned from the local meet-
141. One reason to refuse to certify is especially important. It would certainly be 
appropriate for a union to deny certification to a prospective interest group leader, call 
her Mary, on the ground that it had already certified her interest group, albeit under other 
leadership. To ensure that union funds were used most efficiently, the union could legiti-
mately insist that Mary join a pre-existing group that shared her long-term economic 
interest. If the interest group refused to let Mary join, see text at note 144 infra, she could 
then ask the union leadership to decertify that interest group and to certify her as the head 
of a new interest group; if the union refused, she could appeal to the NLRB. If Mary joined 
the other interest group and then decided that its leaders were incompetent, she could 
attempt to replace them through the group's democratic processes. 
142. Routinely, the NLRB would not reach a decision on the workers' complaint until 
some time after the signing of a new contract. A union that is uncertain about a group's 
certification or veto rights could evaluate its options by refusing to recognize the group 
and awaiting the Regional Director's disposition of a group member's unfair labor practice 
charge. The Director's failure to issue a complaint would end the matter; issuing the 
complaint could be read as informal advice that the interest group should be certified or 
given its veto rights. If a union continued its refusal even though a complaint issued, the 
objecting worker could request that the Director seek a § lO(j) injunction. Section lO(j) of 
the L.M.R.A. (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976), reads, in part: 
The Board shall have the power upon issuance of a complaint ... charging that 
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any 
United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining 
order. Upon the filing of any such petition the ·court • • . shall have jurisdiction to 
grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and 
proper. 
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ings, the union leadership would have to negotiate a contract with 
management.143 It would then present that contract to the mem-
bership for ratification. Before the vote, all members would have 
to declare with which, if any, interest groups they would like to 
affiliate. 144 During the ratification vote, any certified interest 
group could, by a majority vote, 145 veto the entire contract if it 
failed to meet the objections the group had raised in its initial 
request for certification. A veto would be a binding rejection of 
the entire contract; it would force the union to discuss the prob-
lem with the interest group and to renegotiate in good faith with 
management. 
4. Subsequent Limited Vetoes 
After the union leadership and management reached a sec-
ond accord, it would be submitted to the membership. This time, 
interest groups would have only a limited veto. Any group that 
had vetoed the first contract proposal and any group whose inter-
ests had been harmed by the changes between the first and sec-
ond proposals could again veto the proposed contract. However, 
a two-thirds supermajority in favor of ratification would override 
any second veto. 146 Such a limited veto power would ensure that 
interest groups could promote and protect their goals, while safe-
guarding the union majority from tyranny by the few .147 
143. If both union and management consent, the negotiations might involve testi• 
mony and suggestions from interest group representatives. 
144. The factual determination of whether a particular member shares a group's 
defining common economic interest would be made by the interest group leaders, subject 
to appeal to the union leadership and ultimately to review by the NLRB. See note 141 
supra. 
145. Interest groups would make all their decisions by majority vote, even decisions 
on whether to replace their own leaders. Absolute majoritarianism is tolerable in an 
interest group but not in a union because of the assurances of relative homogeneity found 
in the former, Furthermore, participation in an interest group is voluntary; as we have 
seen, representation by a union is not. 
146. Of course, there is nothing sacred about the 2/3 figure. A 60% requirement, or a 
75% requirement might work just as well to protect the many different interests involved. 
147. The limited veto rights also act as a barrier to the formation of fringe and 
splinter groups. Such groups would have little chance of forestalling contract negotiations 
and no chance of mustering the supermajority required to avoid contract ratification. 
Certain groups would recognize this fact without waiting for it to be demonstrated. Skilled 
workers would understand that they will be more successful together than in competition 
with each other. If workers abused the opportunity for interest group formation, it would 
be the union's responsibility to control the situation by refusing to utilize the veto pro-
posal, thereby permitting review by the NLRB. See note 142 supra. 
June 1979] Interest Group Participation 1523 
5. NLRB Review of Union Conduct 
The union bears responsibility for the fair administration of 
the proposal. Any union action inconsistent with the purpose of 
the proposal - failure to certify a legitimate interest group, to 
bargain with management in a manner reflecting in good faith the 
needs of all interest groups, or to recognize a legitimate veto -
could be appealed to the NLRB as a violation of section 
S(b)(l)(A) of the Labor Management Relations Act. If the NLRB 
found a violation, it could order the union to take appropriate 
remedial action. 148 
B. Application of the Veto Proposal 
To see how the veto proposal might operate, consider the 
following hypothetical. Bargaining unit members under 35, who 
constitute 70% of the unit, agitate for a shorter workweek and 
express their willingness to suffer reduced pay in exchange for 
increased leisure time. Workers over 50, who form 20% of the 
bargaining unit, want to maintain existing income levels, in part 
because they worry about the costs of educating their children 
and in part because they can retire early only if they continue to 
build their savings. Workers 36-49, who constitute 10% of the 
bargaining unit, are indifferent about the workweek issue. As-
sume further that the workweek proposal is the only union con-
tract issue that provokes a dispute among the bargaining unit 
members. Although the union leadership prefers the position of 
the younger workers, it wants most to bargain without a strike 
and to reach a contract that will be enthusiastically ratified by 
the membership. 
For the union, the optimal resolution of t~is conflict would 
be a contract term shortening the 40-hour, 5-day workweek by 5 
hours but still ensuring a 40-hours-per-week pay base. All workers 
would be satisfied with this proposal, but (sad to say) manage-
ment would not accept it without serious concessions from the 
workers. Therefore, the leadership concludes that its fallback, or 
realistic, position should be a 36-hour workweek (4 days of9 hours 
each) with a pay base of 36 hours per week. This stance satisfies 
most workers, but older workers object because the 4-day, 36-hour 
week would reduce their earnings. 
Without a veto system, the union could simply ignore its 
148. See text at notes 171-72 infra. 
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older members, with no obligation to seek a compromise. Ratifi-
cation would quickly follow management agreement since the 
dissenting voters constitute only one-fifth of the membership. 
The majoritarian rules of union elections are often insensitive to 
intensities of preferences, and thus the minority status of the 
senior workers would also preclude political reprisal against the 
leadership. 149 Moreover, these workers would find no greater sol-
ace through legal or administrative channels: A duty-of-fair-
representation suit would fail since there is no hostile, discrimina-
tory, or arbitrary element _in the union's decision. 150 
Under the veto proposal, however, older workers have a 
voice. They assert their interest before the union negotiates with 
management, rejecting the shorter-workweek proposal and de-
manding discussion of compromise alternatives. During prenego-
tiation local meetings, where leadership-sponsored contract pro-
posals are presented and membership concerns aired, older work-
ers discuss151 their problems with coworkers and union officials. 
During the local meetings, individual senior workers clarify their 
common interests and band together. They contact similarly situ-
ated members of other locals and build an informal network of 
potential pressure groups. Finally, once it is clear that they need 
formal recognition to press their claim, they apply to the union 
leadership to be certified as an interest group. 
After the union grants certification, the older workers' inter-
est group seeks membership lists and applies for union funds to 
assist its campaign. The union leadership is obligated to send the 
general membership a copy of all disputed workweek proposals 
and to finance mailing the interest group's counter-proposals.'52 
149. Only in the case of a union marked by many dissatisfied interest groups would 
nonratification or use of political influence be possible. But in a union so divided, the 
leadership would most likely avoid alienating a majority of the workers by sidestepping 
sensitive issues in collective bargaining deIJlands. Alternatively, the leadership might 
cater to a sufficient number of powerful interest groups to create a voting majority that 
would support the contract and the leadership. 
150. As the court observed in Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14,453 F.2d 1018, 
1025 (9th Cir. 1972), "it will be the unusual case in which hostile discrimination, bad faith, 
dishonesty, or arbitrary conduct can be alleged" (emphasis added). 
151. The term "discuss" emphasizes that internal union consultations over pro-
posed bargaining demands should precede informal union-management contract talks as 
well as formal bargaining sessions. Discussions held one year before negotiations are 
necessary to permit interest group organizing. If general economic conditions change 
during the year, it may be necessary for the union leadership to consult more generally 
with their constituents. 
152. Compare the similar plan used by the ITU to give the opposition political party 
access to members, discussed in LIPSET, supra note 76, at 297-304. 
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In this case, the older workers suggest that the union take one of 
two positions: insistence on a 36-hour workweek with a 40-hour· 
pay base, even at the expense of other worker privileges, or insist-
ence on a 36-hour workweek with a 36-hour_pay base and guaran-
teed overtime assignments for all older workers, regardless of sen-
iority. 
In response, the younger workers form their own interest 
group, intent on defending the position of the union leadership. 1"3 
The groups debate at the various local meetings, which work as 
a crucible for compromise.154 Gradually, new alternatives evolve. 
The younger workers decide that they could live with a program 
offering guaranteed overtime to senior workers, as long as the 
guarantee only creates preferences for time-and-a-half - and 
not double-time - pay rates. The interest groups conduct 
straw polls of their members to determine which alternatives 
are acceptable and which are not. These polls give the union 
leadership guidelines for its negotiations with management. In 
fact, the negotiators use the guidelines as bargaining tools to 
present management with the nonratification risks associated 
with each management position. The negotiating parties can 
bargain knowing the limit~ of a ratifiable agreement. 
Anything can happen during union-management negotia-
tions, and I will now consider how several different possibilities 
would be treated under the proposal. Suppose first that the union 
leadership and management agree to a contract including a provi-
153. In addition, the older workers' proposal could generate a third faction of workers 
with low seniority who might be displaced due to the high cost of preferential overtime. 
Of course, they would be entitled to the same organizational opportunities as the older 
workers, and ideally, their interest would be accommodated through compromise. If low-
seniority workers were younger workers as well, the younger workers as a group might 
support their colleagues with low seniority. 
The proposal generally requires interest groups to negotiate with the union before the 
union-management bargaining. However, if management subsequently proposes contract 
terms that would disadvantage an identifiable group of workers, the union would have an 
obligation to notify its membership and to submit any subsequent agreement on that issue 
to affected members. (Affected members would be identified by local officials.) Of necess-
ity, the requirement of union-initiated notification regarding controversial management 
proposals would be limited to those situations where the harm to economic groups within 
unions was or should have been clear. 
154. A union could decide, in consultation with its membership, that the best way 
to deal with sustained disagreement over contract terms is to submit the matter to an 
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. In order to avoid biased decisions, the arbitrator would 
need to be designated as a permanent umpire for intraunion disputes with an established 
tenure; and the arbitrator would be required to give up any union-management appoint-
ments as arbitrator for issues arising under the collective bargaining agreement. 
1526 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1486 
sion identical to the union'·s original fallback position: a 36-hour 
·workweek, with a 36-hour pay base and no guaranteed overtime. 
In such a situation the older workers' interest group would have 
legitimate grounds to veto the agreement because it is directly 
opposed to the interests they expressed earlier. Of course, the 
older workers may decide not to exercise the veto - a majority 
of the interest group may prefer the security and over-all terms 
of the negotiated contract. Assuming that the older workers 
veto, however, the union leadership must decide whether to rec-
ognize the veto as a legitimate expression of interest group 
goals. 155 Under these circumstances, the leadership probably 
would; to defy the veto and declare the negotiated contraGt valid 
would certainly invite a successful appeal to the NLRB. After 
the veto, the leadership would caucus with the interest groups 
once more and return to bargain with management a second 
time. If still dissatisfied with the results, the interest group 
could impose a supermajority requirement for ratification by 
registering its disapproval. 156 Should the requisite super-
majority ratify this version, the older workers' only recourse 
would be to complain that the union had violated its duty by 
not bargaining in good faith. 
But things may not go so smoothly. During the first negotia-
tions; management and the union may not agree to anything that 
anyone had proposed earlier. They may come up with a contract 
including a clause offering a 36-hour workweek with a 36-hour pay 
base and guaranteed overtime up to 39½ hours per week. Such. a 
proposal would be very close to what the older workers had asked 
for, and thus one might expect them to choose not to veto. Yet 
perhaps this is a particularly contentious interest group, one that 
has been ignored for many years. The group may choose to veto 
anyway. In such an instance, the union leadership may reasona-
bly decide that the interest group's behavior is beyond the legiti-
mate scope of their interest and therefore choose not to recognize 
the veto. The interest group's appeal to the NLRB would most 
155. As is true throughout this proposal, the union administers every stage of the 
system. Its judgment is subject to review by the NLRB. 
156. One reason that members might vote for ratification in such large numbers, 
despite the opposition of toworkers, would be a union assertion that the barrier to a 
satisfactory compromise on the workweek issue was the employer's unwillingness to ap• 
prove any workweek contract term acceptable to the interest groups. The union's responsi-
bility to a defeated interest group in this situation would be to file an unfair labor practice 
claim for refusal to bargain under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), and to attempt to persuade 
the management negotiators to embrace a workweek proposal acceptable to the union as 
a whole in the next negotiations. 
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likely fail because of the close similarity of the group's expressed 
goals and the ratified provisions. 
Thus, in my hypothetical, the veto proposal would help the 
older workers without allowing them to strangle the union. A 
group that is -normally ignored would be given enough power to 
force discussion and a search for compromise, ht;tt not enough 
power to hold the majority hostage. This delicate balance is fairer 
than the accommodation reached under the present system. 
C. NLRB Review of Union Conduct and Decisions 
1. Union Action That Violates Section B(b)(l)(A) 
Under the veto proposal, various types of union conduct 
would be vulnerable to attack through section 8(b)(l)(A). First, 
union leadership might not hold local meetings to discuss pro-
posed contract terms. Although I sincerely doubt that a union 
would ever violate the proposal so blatantly, the possibility 
should not be completely discounted. A union bent on defying 
section 8(b)(l)(A) or the duty of fair representation would proba-
bly prefer subtler efforts to exclude dissidents from local meetings 
or to limit the scope and amount of debate. Nonetheless, the 
NLRB should strike down with equal vehemence both the ob-
vious and the devious forms of bad faith. 157 
The union could also violate section 8(b)(l)(A) by refusing 
to acknowledge an interest group; to circulate its proposals among 
the membership, or to provide funds for it to conduct its cam-
paign. For example, if three workers in a small New Jersey local 
complained at a local meeting, declaring their dissatisfaction 
with the union's treatment of workers who share their interests, 
the president of the local would be obligated to inform them of 
their right to seek certification. Should they pursue that right, the 
union leadership would need to decide the showing of interest 
required to certify an interest group. The spirit of the veto pro-
posal suggests that unions ought to respond to all expressions of 
discontent. On the other hand, the interest group ce:i;tification 
process might be exploited by workers wanting to pursue petty 
vendettas or to siphon off union funds. That is a serious danger; 
I would therefore suggest that the NLRB find a violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(l)(A) only when there is evidence that the leadership 
157. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 232 U.S. 192, 204 (1944), establishes that all 
unions must give bargaining unit members the opportunity_ to· express their views on 
collective bargaining issues. 
1528 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1485 
ignored a group whose interests were held throughout the mem-
bership, or were of compelling national concern. 
For example, a union proposal to shorten the workweek 
would affect most workers' economic status and could be ex-
pected to inspire argument in each local. Once the locals fulfilled 
their duty to inform members of their right to apply for certifica-
tion as an interest group, applications would undoubtedly flood 
the national headquarters. In such a situation, no one would 
question the significance of the interest. One can imagine other 
proposals that might stb:µulate opposition less widespread, but 
just as substantial. A proposal sacrificing benefits for those who 
are relocated might only receive criticism in those locals with high 
turnover rates; nonetheless, the opposition could be substantial 
enough to warrant certification if the dissidents could adequately 
define their shared economic interest. 
There may even be situations where a union has a duty to 
respond although only a few locals report membership agitation. 
For example, only scattered locals having a high percentage of 
blacks and hispanics would be apt to propose a contract clause 
mandating preferential treatment for qualified members of mi-
nority groups. However, the small number of concerned locals 
should not relieve the union of responsibility to recognize the 
group, circulate the proposal, and support the group financially. 
The issue raised is of general social concern and a union would 
surely confront it eventually. 158 That the union did not choose the 
timing or forum for discussing the issue should be irrelevant to 
its obligation to deal with something so intimately related to both 
worker livelihood and public policy. The NLRB could require 
unions to follow the veto proposal procedures whenever the lead-
ership knows or should know that a decision is vital to a discrete 
group within the union. 
A final way for union leaders to violate section S(b)(l)(A) 
would be to negotiate with management in bad faith or in disre-
158. Sensitive or inherently disruptive issues that are not of current concern might 
not be sufficiently important to require immediate union discussion. For example, re-
quests by blacks for a contract clause mandating preferential treatment would not require 
union response if made in 1930, because the contemporary climate would not alert the 
union that the issue was of general concern and was expected to be dealt with in the near 
future. Such demands would require union consideration in 1970. To the extent that 
guidelines are required for union decisions as to the seriousness or relevancy of interest 
group complaints, the Board could decide to require union compliance with the veto 
proposal when interest groups raise issues concerning all mandatory subjects of bargaining 
and those permissive subjects that are commonly bargained over in the industry. 
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• gard of the veto procedures. This category of violations would 
include failure to negotiate consistently with the interest group 
objectives, failure to allow the affected interest groups an oppor-
tunity to veto any union-management proposals that differ signif-
icantly from intraunion compromises, refusal to recognize legiti-
mate interest group vetoes, and, perhaps, knowing use of griev-
ance settlements to change the meaning of previously ratified 
contract provisions in a way that harms interest groups. In each 
of these circumstances the NLRB should consider the reasons for 
the union's final decision (such as employer intractability or a 
reasonable belief that the rejected interest group proposal was 
unlawful), and the fairness of the union's decision in light of 
compromise discussions. 159 In essence, the Board would evaluate 
the union's bargaining posture. 160 
If the Board found in favor of the complaining interest group, 
it could choose among a variety of remedies commensurate with 
the nature and extent of the union violation. The NLRB might 
set aside the bargaining agreement or sever any offending provi-
sions. It might also order the parties to bargain again and reach 
an agreement consistent with particular guidelines. If the NLRB 
required renegotiation of the offending provisions or the entire 
contract, it might direct the union and management to permit 
representatives of the affected interest groups to be parties to the 
negotiation. Even if it stopped short of ordering full participation 
in the negotiations, the NLRB might insist on interest group 
ratification of any subsequently negotiated contract or clause. Of 
course, the NLRB need not void the contract or sever the chal-
lenged provision. If the effect of the union's violation on interest 
group members is minor, the Board might order the. union to 
compensate any disadvantaged workers but let the bargain stand. 
This lesser remedy would be available, standing alone or as a 
supplement to stronger sanctions, no matter what form the 
Board's order took. Similarly, the Board could hold the union 
159. The Board's role would be different from that condemned in H.K. Porter Co., 
Disston Div.-Danville Works v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), in which the Supreme Court 
held that the Board could not itself impose a contract term on the parties as a remedy for 
violating§ 8(d) of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Under the veto proposal, the 
Board would be evaluating the union's conduct and the fairness of the union's decision to 
the protesting interest group, not the quality of the bargain struck by union and manage-
ment. To the extent that employer intractability or the illegality of the proposed contract 
provision constitute defenses, there would be no violation of§ 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 
158(b )(l)(A) (1976). , 
160. This is similar to the Board's role in duty-of-fair-representation cases. 
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• liable to management for any monetary loss that the union's 
unlawful conduct caused. Whatever option the Board chose, it 
would have to ensure that the remedy was adequate to protect 
minority interests. 
2. Designation of the NLRB to Remedy Violations 
For purposes of description I have assumed that the NLRB 
will hear the employee challenges to union conduct under the 
interest-group-veto proposal. Although the NLRB is not the only 
possible reviewing agency, it is probably the most appropriate. 
Because my proposal governs conflicts between employee-
workplace expectations and general union interests, it affects 
matters traditionally adjudged within the scope of the NLRA, the 
Act from which the Board draws its purpose and direction. More-
over, the NLRB has already developed a familiarity with worker-
union conflicts over bargaining and grievance arbitration through 
cases alleging violations of the duty of fair representation. The 
Ninth Circuit has noted, "As a practical matter, intra-union con-
duct could not be wholly excluded from the duty of fair represen-
tation, for . . . internal union policies and practices may have a 
substantial impact upon the external relationships of members of 
the unit to their employer."161,This familiarity would be useful in 
the early stages of implementing the veto proposal. Although 
federal judges are no doubt as able as Board members to evaluate 
straightforward claims of frustrated employee expectations, they 
lack the Board's intimacy with the union environment in which 
contract proposals are spawned.162 In addition, litigating a chal-
lenge to union conduct before the Board may save time and 
money. 
The NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over claims alleging 
union interference with members' statutory or contractual rights 
even where there was no allegation that the union violated its 
duty of fair representation. In Glass Bottle Blowers Association 
(Owen-Illinois, Inc.}163 the Board found an independent violation 
of section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Sixth Cir-
161. Retana v. Apartment Operators Loca114, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1972). 
162. There are two methods for attacking alleged violations of the duty of fair repre• 
sentation. See note 35 supra. 
163. 210 N.L.R.B. 943 (1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975). See also 1AM 
Local 697 (Canfield Rubber), 223 N.L.R.B. 832 (1976) (ordering local to handle grievances 
of any bargaining unit member, without regard to union membership). 
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cuit enforced its order. 164 The Board determined that the union 
had violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by maintaining sex-segregated 
locals, each processing its own grievances although they operated 
under identical contracts. Since resolution of a grievance brought 
by either local would be binding on both, the first local to prose-
cute controlled the fate of any disputed contract interpretation 
issue. As Member Kennedy stated, "Denial of a voice to those 
who may be affected by the settlement of a grievance is an inter-
ference with Section 7 rights."165 
The only plausible alternative to Board review of employee 
challenges under the veto proposal is arbitration. Arbitrators 
have surely developed a great sensitivity to issues of contract 
interpretation and industrial practice. However, two objections to 
the use of arbitrators appear decisive. First, disputes would in-
volve not only concerns with grievance-arbitration procedures, 
but also statutory rights under section 7 of the Taft-Hartley 
Act. 166 Despite a preference for arbitral resolution of labor dis-
putes, even the NLRB has recognized that it would be inappro-
priate to defer to arbitration when violations of section 7 rights 
are alleged. 167 More importantly, arbitrators, because they spe-
cialize in applying individual contractual provisions to single 
events, are relatively unconcerned with establishing uniformity 
among decisions interpreting different contracts. But uniform 
standards of union conduct are essential to the operation of the 
veto proposal: the proposal must protect all minority causes 
equally, even unpopular ones. Thus, the Board is the proper 
agency to provide consistency and to develop guidelines by which 
unions may judge their own conduct. 
3. Authority of the NLRB to Find and Remedy Violations 
There are three ways to establish the veto proposal and per-
mit the Board to review union conduct. Congress could add a new 
unfair labor practice provision to the NLRA. Such a provision 
might read as follows: 
164. NLRB v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975). 
165. 210 N.L.R,B. at 946. (Member Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). The Sixth Circ'uit upheld the Board's order requiring the merger of the two locals, 
despite the proviso to§ 8(b)(l)(A) which permits unions to establish their own member-
ship criteria. 520 F.2d at 697. 
166. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1976). 
167. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). 
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8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization 
or its agents 
(8) not to recognize and attempt to accommodate the di-
verging economic interests within any bargaining unit, 
provided that said interests are made known to the 
labor organization in a timely manner and with a suffi-
cient showing of interest, as provided for by the deci-
sions of or regulations promulgated by the National 
Labor Relations Board. 
Second, the NLRB might incorporate the veto through its 
decisions, finding that a union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by not 
dealing fairly with the protests of an interest group. 168 The Board 
could describe the procedures expected of l~bor unions in such a 
decision. 
Finally, the NLRB could promulgate rules and regulations, 
as provided for in section 6 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 160 articulating 
the position of interest groups and the responsibilities of unions. 1711 
Failure to meet these regulations would constitute a violation of 
section 8(b)(l)(A). For my purposes, this last approach is the 
most satisfactory. It would not require the legislative action that 
the first option entails, and unlike the second option, it would 
provide adequate notice of the Board's intentions and allow pub-
lic comment before taking effect. 
Whichever of the three methods of implementing the interest 
group veto proposal the Board selects, it already has the power 
to enforce the proposal pursuant to its authority to remedy any 
unfair labor practice violation under section lO(c) of Taf't-
Hartley: 
[The Board may] issue and cause to be served . . . an order 
requiring [the violator] to cease and desist from such unfair labor 
practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the 
policies of this [Act].171 
168. The NLRB routinely announces new rules of decision when adjudicating cases, 
See, e.g., Shopping Kart Food Mkts. Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190 (1977), Of course, the 
Board may also recant and revive the prior rule of decision as it did when it overruled 
Shopping Kart in General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1978), 
169. 29 u.s.c. § 156 (1976). 
170. The NLRB has rarely used the rulemaking approach to regulating conduct under 
the NLRA. For a general discussion of the issue involved, see Bernstein, The NLRB's 
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE 
L.J. 571 (1970). 
171. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) (emphasis added). 
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Courts have broadly construed that authority to issue affirmative 
orders, not limiting it to the specific remedy of reinstatement. 172 
They could certainly construe it to permit the sanctions necessary 
to effectuate the veto proposal. 
N. CONCLUSION: WHY FOLLOW THE VETO PATH? 
The traditional internal union structure of unbridled major-
ity rule evolved at a time when survival of the labor movement 
was conjectural. There is no longer any question, however, about 
the ability of modern labor organizations to organize workers, 
negotiate with management, and effectively administer collective 
bargaining agreements. 173 Thus, the need to concentrate power in 
a few leaders and limit rank-and-file debate over policy has 
abated. With the issue no longer union survival but the quality 
of union representation, 174 the focus of contemporary debate 
should be on alternative means of structuring the relationship 
between the union leadership and union members. 
In this Article I have proposed a new plan, one that speaks 
directly to the workers' need for better control over the terms of 
their employment contracts. Its centerpiece, the interest group 
veto, has already received a limited test from one major union, 
the United Auto Workers. 175 Since 1957, the UAW has attempted 
to quell the dissatisfaction of skilled workers by increasing their 
control over the contract ratification process. The UAW constitu-
172. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) ("Making the work-
ers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication 
of the public policy which the Board enforces."); Wicker v. Hoppok, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 
99 (1867), quoted with approval in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 
(1975) ("The general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives a remedy, 
the compensation shall be equal to the injury. The latter is the standard by which the 
former is to be measured. The injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the 
situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed."). 
173. The Supreme Court noted this change in the emphasis of labor law in Boy's 
Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970), where it observed that there 
has been a shift "from protection of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement 
of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of 
industrial disputes." 
174. The Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has identified 
different workplace changes to which unions have failed to respond: "the thrust of minori-
ties with many demands for jobs, for improvement of jobs, for acceptance into the system 
. • • new attitudes, new mores, a change in the value system of younger people coming 
into the workforce." Horvitz, supra note 119, at 453, 454. 
175. In addition, some workers have formed caucuses within their unions to pressure 
union leadership into recognizing the interests of caucus members. Unlike the proposed 
economic interest groups, however, these caucuses have no right or power to reject union 
decisions and the membership may be constant over time, regardless of the particular 
issues on which the caucuses are working. 
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tion was amended in that year to permit skilled trades and pro-
duction workers to vote separately on contract "matters that are 
common to all members."176 In 1966, the skilled workers were able 
to pressure the UAW into amending the constitution further, to 
provide that production and skilled-trades workers "would vote 
separately on contractual matters common to all and, in the 
same vote, on matters which relate exclusively to their group."177 
As then-Vice President Leonard Woodcock explained the amend-
ment: 
What happens when one group rejects and the other accepts? Well, 
it is pretty obvious what happens if production rejects, because the 
majority is an automatic rejection, isn't it? But . . . . what hap-
pens when production accepts and skilled trades rejects? 
[W]e want to say here and now that separate ratification is 
an empty process, and it cannot trigger necessary action to solve 
problems that have led to rejection if it does not lead to pressure 
on the companies. 
So we want to say very clearly, if either group rejects, then 
there is no agreement . . . .178 
The UAW decision to give skilled trades workers veto power 
over the entire bargaining agreement was not altruistic. The In-
ternational Society of Skilled Trades (ISST) was agitating to pull 
the skilled trades workers out of the primarily industrial UAW on 
the ground that it did not adequately promote the specialized 
interests of the skilled workers. 179 The UAW needed the leverage 
176. UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) PROCEEDINGS, SIXTEENTH CON· 
STITUTJONAL CONVENTION 275 (1957). The debate on the proposal is at 278-88. In addition 
to granting separate ratification rights to production and skilled workers, the amendment 
extended these rights to office workers, engineers, and technicians, on application to and 
approval of the International Executive Board. 
177. UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) PROCEEDINGS, TwENTIETH CON· 
STITUTI0NAL CONVENTION 405 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 20TH CoNV.]. The debate on the 
proposal is at 405-13. The UAW also extended special ratification rights to office workers, 
engineers, and technicians. See note 176 supra. 
178. Id. at 407. When tested in 1973, the UAW public review board rendered the 
separate ratification rights provision useless. See Poszich v. UAW Local 316 (Pub. ~ev. 
Bd., Intl. Union UAW, April 10, 1974), [BNA] Daily Labor Reporter, No. 75, at E-10, 
April 17, 1974. For a description and early analysis of the public review board, see J, 
STEIBER, W.E. OBEROR, & M. HARRINGTON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC REVIEWS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE UAW PUBLIC REVIEW BOARD (1960). More recent evaluations appear in Brooks, 
Stability Versus Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 344, 359-61 (1976); THE DUTY 
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 36, at 99-103. 
179. See Brooks, supra note 178, at 357-61, for a description of the relationship be-
tween !SST organizing efforts, NLRB rules on disaffiliation and separate bargaining 
units for skilled workers, and the UAW decision to grant greater internal power to the 
'skilled-trades members. See also Raskin, Labor: Mass-Production Unions Facing Schism 
in their 8anks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 47, col. 1. 
,, 
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provided by the skilled workers when bargaining for the more 
easily replaced production workers, and the leadership believed 
that the union's future depended on adapting to automation and 
converting production workers into skilled tradespeople. Thus, 
the UA W's grant of special veto rights to an interest group was 
one union's response to a powerful minority whose value out-
weighed the majority's interest in retaining unlimited control. 1811 
Obviously, most economic interest groups lack the leverage of the 
skilled workers in the UAW. But the UAW example demonstrates 
that a large, international union believes that it can function 
effectively in the face of a potential veto by an interest group. 181 
The general veto proposal goes beyond the narrow UAW sys-
tem and further improves the quality of representation. Its princi-
pal advantage is that its procedures encourage rank-and-file par-
ticipation in union activities. Regardless of whether they use the 
veto successfully, workers who share economic interests and who 
join together to further those interests may regain some control 
over their economic lives by influencing union decisions or even 
by seeking positions of authority within their unions. 182 Further-
The UAW constitution also provides that "contract or supplement demands affecting 
skilled workers . . .. shall be submitted to the Skilled Trades Department [before being 
submitted to management] in order to effectuate an industry-wide standardization of 
agreements on wages, hours, apprenticeship programs, journeymen standards and working 
conditions." 20rH CoNV., supra note 176, at 405. 
180. Other unions have responded to worker dissatisfaction in less radical ways. One 
interesting approach, which incorporates some procedural aspects of the veto proposal, is 
that of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCA W) union, which represents about 
60,000 workers who are under 400 contracts. The OCA W has a policy of prenegotiation 
meetings which maximizes worker participation in formulating union bargaining goals. 
Bargaining demands are promulgated by a national bargaining policy committee, com-
posed of eight rank-and-file workers and four administration officers, after a conference 
at which rank-and-file workers meet to suggest bargaining policy. The bargaining de-
mands established by the national bargaining council are then submitted for ratification 
to every bargaining unit in the country. See 98 L.R.R.M. 131 (1978). 
181. Furthermore, the auto companies' acceptance of the UAW decision to condition 
final ratification of any bargaining agreement on approval by the skilled-trades workers 
suggests that private sector management is able to live with conditional agreements and 
to deal with the pressures inherent in separate ratification. 
182. Although participation in union political life may be a beneficial by-product of 
the veto procedures, the proposal is not designed as a means for developing an established 
political party which opposes the incumbent leadership. Under the veto proposal the 
likelihood that formation of an economic interest group will lead to political aspirations 
on the part of interest group members is great; but the opportunity to challenge the 
leadership of the union is remote, since a single-issue interest' group would not create a 
stable, loyal, and hardworking constituency. At most, the leaders of interest groups would 
develop the abilities required to become part of the existing political process within the 
unions. 
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more, increased member participation strengthens unions and 
improves the public image of these vital economic institutions. •Ha 
The veto proposal also enhances union responsiveness to 
member needs because it requires interest groups to identify their 
concerns and formulate concrete alternatives to leadership pro-
posals. And since the employees themselves must designate 
which union decisions are significant, increased participation 
helps the NLRB, union leadership, and management. The Board, 
drawing on an interest group's initial statement of goals and the 
positions it takes during subsequent negotiations, is better able 
to evaluate the reasonableness of an employee's challenge. With-
out these employee-initiated guidelines, the Board must specu-
late about an item's significance to protesting employees and 
about the fairness of the union's decision in light of alternatives 
that the union may or may not have been aware of during con-
tract negotiations or grievance procedures. Additionally, because 
interest groups must identify themselves (and their leaders) sea-
sonably, the proposal limits the nature and frequency of Board 
findings that invalidate union-employer decisions. Most will be 
disposed of on simple procedural grounds. 
From the union's perspective, the veto plan directs attention 
toward issues which workers feel are important through early 
group self-identification and the requirement that interest groups 
formulate proposals to deal with their concerns. This information 
should aid the leadership in revising and improving its own con-
tract proposals. Management, too, may benefit. Informed by the 
union leadership about interest group formation and demands, 
management can foresee challenges to the negotiated contract 
and, to some extent, avoid them through anticipatory bargaining. 
The proposal spares the outside observer the onerous task of de-
riving the hierarchy of workers' values. Moreover, since the veto 
proposal places pressure on leadership to accommodate interest 
group demands, it may lessen the likelihood of wildcat strikes. 184 
The proposal thus contributes in many ways to stability in collec-
tive bargaining. 
Finally, by requiring unions to permit all interested members 
183. As pointed out previously, membership participation in union meetings is 
greater when critical decisions about union policies are under consideration than when 
routine business matters are on the agenda. Therefore, the generally low participation 
rates are irrelevant to this discussion and do not undercut the point being made. See note 
89 supra. 
184. See notes 117.~to supra and accompanying text. 
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to participate in union decisions, the veto proposal strengthens 
the law's protection of the legitimate interests of each member. 
Through this process, each union and concerned· interest group 
should reach a decision that will more evenly distribute economic 
benefits to all bargaining unit members, unlike the present sys-
tem, which assigns contractual benefits by the vote of a bare 
majority of workers. At the same ,time, the .proposal blocks at-
tempts by a powerful minority group, such as the skilled workers 
in an industrial union, to insist on the lion's share of wage in-
creases for themselves, since it retains a modified principle of 
majority rule. In such a circumstance, discussions between skilled 
and industrial workers could lead to mutual understanding of 
each other's concerns, to compromise, and to accommodation. 
Congress has bestowed upon unions the authority to speak 
for the workers they represent and to make decisions affecting the 
economic lives of those workers. The need for a strong voice on 
behalf of a union's constituency is clear, but the need for a single 
voice is less clear. Unionized workers, even those holding unusual 
views, deserve some control over the decisions that their unions 
make in determining bargaining goals. This Article proposes that 
unions adopt a process through which workers may take an active 
role in formulating union priorities and by which all unionized 
workers could assert their interests in contract issues of particular 
significance to their economic well-being. 
The veto proposal, for all its laudable objectives, is not with-
out its costs. It may involve more time and money than simpler 
ideas. It may increase the workload of the NLRB. 185 But the pro-
posal offers a prototypical framework for giving individual work-
ers a stronger voice in their own unions. Its concern with interest 
group formation and with union leadership accountability are 
intended to stimulate further inquiry and discussion about the 
relationship between a union and the economic needs of its mem-
bers. · · 
The struggle to achieve recognition infused the labor move-
ment with dedication and idealism. That fervor abated as unions 
secured parity with management at the bargaining table. The 
labor movement's next task is to ensure that all union members 
185. A proliferation of interest groups can be anticipated following adoption of the 
veto proposal and there is no way to know the effect of this development on the functioning 
of labor unions. I suspect, however, that the ease with which interest groups can be 
formed, see text at notes 140-42 supra, is adequately counterbalanced by the requirements 
for a successful veto, see notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text. 
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have genuine control over how the fruits of that parity are distrib-
uted. As Joel Seidman has observed: "One of the tests of union 
democracy is whether members are free to express opposition to 
the leaders and their policies without fear of reprisal. Even more 
important, it seems to me, is whether they possess the right to 
organize to make their opposition effective."186 The veto proposal, 
by guaranteeing effective and loyal opposition, may provide the 
necessary spark to recapture labor's lost enthusiasm. 
186. J. SEIDMAN, supra note 14, at 37. 
